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CRIMINAL LAW 
SHADOW IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL DANGERS 
MAUREEN A. SWEENEY* 
This Article introduces the concept of “shadow immigration 
enforcement”—that is, the increasingly common and troubling phenomenon 
of improper involvement in federal immigration enforcement by state and 
local law enforcement officers. 
Shadow immigration enforcement occurs when state or local police 
officers with no immigration enforcement authority exercise their regular 
police powers in a distorted way for the purpose of increasing federal 
immigration enforcement.  Shadow enforcement typically involves the 
disproportionate targeting of vulnerable “foreign-seeming” populations for 
hyper-enforcement for reasons wholly independent of suspected 
involvement in criminal activity as defined by state or local law.  At best, 
the state officers use the enforcement of laws within their mandate (criminal 
or traffic laws) as a pretext for targeting those suspected of having unlawful 
immigration status, often based on observable ethnic or racial 
characteristics. 
This shadow enforcement raises qualitatively different civil rights and 
constitutional concerns from those that arise in immigration enforcement 
carried out by Department of Homeland Security officers.  On the one 
hand, the overlap of the targeted population with identifiable racial 
minorities (most notably Latinos) raises special constitutional concerns.  
On the other, the “under the table” nature of the enforcement incentives, 
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of Law.  The author wishes to thank Richard Boldt, Randy Hertz, Deborah Eisenberg, 
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and Robert Morris for their thoughtful comments on this work and to acknowledge the 
excellent research assistance of Lauren Gold, Marta Hernandez Araujo, and Susan 
McCarthy.  This Article is dedicated to the clients of the University of Maryland Carey 
Immigration Clinic, whose unshakeable dignity in the face of discrimination is worth 
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confusion over enforcement authority, and the utter lack of accountability 
are also extremely troubling.  Moreover, the usual constitutional 
safeguards that seek to protect the public from biased and distorted 
policing—specific regulations, training and discipline of officers, and using 
the exclusionary rule in court proceedings—do not serve as effective 
protection against, or deterrents to, shadow enforcement, because existing 
accountability structures do not adequately account for this type of 
enforcement. 
This Article explores the specific constitutional dangers created by 
shadow immigration enforcement by state and local officers and proposes 
strategies for responding to those dangers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with the Constitution’s 
protections of the individual against certain exercises of official power.  It is precisely 
the predictability of these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional 
safeguards.1 
—Justice Potter Stewart 
 
The last thirty years have seen an important shift in the federalism of 
immigration law, as the federal government has gradually enlisted state and 
local law enforcement officers as “force multipliers”2 in its enforcement of 
our nation’s immigration laws, and our systems of criminal and 
immigration enforcement have gradually converged.  Police and sheriffs’ 
deputies throughout the country now routinely participate in federal 
immigration enforcement through a variety of programs that involve them 
in the day-to-day mechanics of checking immigration status and 
communicating that information to federal authorities.  In some limited 
circumstances, these local officers may have been delegated authority to 
investigate immigration status,3 but the much more common and troubling 
phenomenon occurs when officers gather immigration information through 
their regular law enforcement duties and communicate that information to 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as an informal way of 
assisting the agency.  This kind of communication has escalated sharply in 
recent years and, having been sanctioned by the Supreme Court in Arizona 
v. United States,4 is unlikely to lessen anytime soon.   
While the sharing of information itself seems unobjectionable, this 
informal and unregulated collaboration between federal, state, and local 
 
1 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973). 
2 See, e.g., Examining 287(g): The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement in 
Immigration Law: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 111th Cong. 1 (2009) 
(statement of Rep. Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman of H. Comm. on Homeland Sec.) 
(describing 287(g) agreements as allowing ICE to utilize state and local officers as force 
multipliers in both task forces and detention facilities); New “Dual Missions” of the 
Immigration Enforcement Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Border 
Sec., and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5 (2005) (testimony of 
Michael Cutler, former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Senior Special Agent).  
The idea of the force multiplier has been promoted by Kris Kobach, among others.  See, e.g., 
Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local 
Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 181 (2006); Jeff Sessions & 
Cynthia Hayden, The Growing Role for State and Local Law Enforcement in the Realm of 
Immigration Law, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 323, 327 (2005). 
3 See infra text accompanying notes 27–33. 
4 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2508 (2012) (emphasizing the importance to 
the immigration system of consultation between federal and state officials). 
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officers with differing enforcement mandates has a number of serious but 
generally unintended negative consequences.  Many of these consequences 
coalesce in what I term “shadow immigration enforcement” by state and 
local officers. 
Shadow immigration enforcement is the distorted exercise of regular 
policing powers by a state or local officer who has no immigration 
enforcement authority for the purpose of increasing immigration 
enforcement.  In a regular law enforcement environment, shadow 
enforcement involves the disproportionate targeting of vulnerable “foreign-
seeming” populations for hyper-enforcement for reasons wholly 
independent of suspected involvement in criminal activity as defined by 
state or local law.  Shadow enforcement occurs at the margins of regular 
police work, external to the enforcement mandate of state troopers, local 
police, and sheriffs’ deputies.  In the vast majority of cases, these officers 
have no training, mandate, or authority to enforce federal immigration law.  
Their involvement in the routine communication of immigration 
information to federal authorities, however, can create strong and 
sometimes perverse incentives that distort the ways in which they carry out 
their mandated policing duties.  The lure of possible immigration checks, 
for example, can influence the officers’ choice of targets for traffic 
enforcement or whether to merely cite people for offenses or to arrest them 
(and thus bring them into the station for fingerprint checks that can reveal 
immigration status).5  This dynamic generally goes unacknowledged and 
unregulated within regular police structures.  It operates under the table, in 
the shadows.  The effects of shadow immigration incentives are widespread 
and profound for the relationship between local law enforcement and the 
broad communities they serve, especially with regard to community trust 
and guarantees against biased policing based on race or national origin. 
A few concrete illustrations help to describe the phenomenon of 
shadow enforcement and to highlight its dangers.  The U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ) Civil Rights Division recently conducted a number of 
investigations of biased policing that revealed compelling evidence of 
shadow immigration enforcement, which both distorted the conduct of 
regular policing in local jurisdictions and resulted in rampant civil rights 
violations.  One of these investigations focused on the sheriff’s office in 
 
5 For example, DOJ’s investigation of racially biased policing in Alamance County, 
North Carolina, revealed that the sheriff there had instructed his officers to arrest, rather than 
merely cite, Latino drivers (but not other nationalities).  The sheriff said: “If you stop a 
Mexican, don’t write a citation, arrest him.”  Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y 
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., to Clyde B. Albright, Cnty. Att’y, Alamance 
Cnty., & Chuck Kitchen, Turrentine Law Firm 5 (Sept. 18, 2012) [hereinafter DOJ Letter to 
Alamance County], available at http://goo.gl/vovKgM. 
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Alamance, North Carolina.  After an exhaustive two-year investigation that 
included statistics and records review; review of policies, procedures, and 
training materials; and over 125 interviews, DOJ concluded that the 
sheriff’s office engaged in a pervasive pattern or practice of biased policing 
targeted against Latinos.6  Among other problems, DOJ found that Latino 
drivers were targeted for traffic enforcement at a rate between four and ten 
times greater than non-Latino drivers.7  Notably, DOJ found that many of 
the deputies’ discriminatory practices were specifically intended to facilitate 
immigration checks on the targeted Latinos, thus connecting the racially 
targeted policing to shadow immigration enforcement.8 
Another illustration of these dynamics in a different context can be 
seen in the recent investigations of Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) officers at various airports.9  The officers in question were specially 
trained “assessors” as part of a model behavior detection antiterrorism 
program tasked with detecting unusual behavior in passengers that could 
indicate a security threat.  But officers reported that managers in Boston, 
anxious to boost numbers and justify their program, pressured their 
assessors to meet certain threshold numbers for referrals to other law 
enforcement agencies, including the state police and immigration officials.  
To meet those thresholds, significant numbers of officers explicitly targeted 
blacks and Latinos in the hope that searches would yield drugs or 
immigration problems.10  In the words of an attorney who interviewed eight 
officers who complained about the rampant practice, “Selecting people 
based on race or ethnicity was a way of finding easy marks.”11  Officers 
reported that as many as 80% of passengers searched during certain shifts 
were minorities and that so many minorities were referred to the state police 
that officers there questioned why minorities represented such a 
disproportionate number of those referred.12  In Newark, New Jersey, the 
racial profiling of Mexicans and Dominicans was so blatant that fellow 
TSA officers called that airport’s behavior detection group “the great 
Mexican hunters.”13  Officers reported that the direction for these practices 
came to them from their superiors who conveyed that they were “to go look 
 
6 Id. at 2. 
7 Id. at 3. 
8 Id. at 6. 
9 See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt & Eric Lichtblau, Racial Profiling Rife at Airport, U.S. 
Officers Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2012, at A1; Steve Strunsky, Racial Profiling at Airport 
Revealed, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 12, 2011, at 1.  
10 Schmidt & Lichtblau, supra note 9. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Strunsky, supra note 9. 
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for illegal aliens and make up behaviors” with which they could justify and 
document a referral to immigration authorities.14 
Finally, there are instances when even this thin veneer of regular law 
enforcement disappears, leaving a state officer with absolutely no 
justification for an arrest other than immigration enforcement that is wholly 
outside his authority.  Recently, in Maryland, a Latino man was called to 
the scene of a traffic stop to recover his car, which someone else had been 
driving.  When he arrived at the scene (at the officer’s request and having 
committed no violation of traffic or other state law), he was immediately 
questioned by the officer about his immigration status; had his keys taken; 
and was removed from the car, handcuffed, taken to a holding cell, and held 
for approximately two hours for purposes of “immigration investigation” 
before he was turned over to Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE).15  The state officer had no delegated federal authority to conduct 
civil immigration enforcement, and he did not have authority under state 
law to detain or arrest this man for a (nonexistent) state crime or for a 
federal administrative violation.  When the officer was questioned in 
immigration court about the legal basis for his actions, he acknowledged 
that he had no authority to enforce federal civil immigration violations and 
explained that this was why he had merely “detained,” rather than arrested, 
the man.16  He further explained that he was not required to inform the man 
of his right to remain silent under Miranda or to comply with other arrest 
procedures because the man was not being accused of a crime.17  In other 
words, precisely because the officer was acting without legal authority, he 
took the position that the usual legal limits to his authority did not apply, 
leaving him free to act without constitutional justification. 
These examples demonstrate how the lure of the easy, collateral 
immigration arrest has proved to be strong for officers in a variety of 
contexts.  In some cases, politically accountable enforcement policymakers, 
such as sheriffs, encourage officers to be tough on immigration and to 
increase immigration-related arrests.  In others, officers seem to internalize 
and respond to rhetoric that has increasingly cast unlawful immigration as a 
 
14 Id. 
15 Transcript of Removal Proceedings Hearing at 100, 106, 117–18, 121, [name and case 
number redacted] (U.S. Immigration Ct., Baltimore, Dec. 9, 2009) (on file with the Journal 
of Criminal Law and Criminology) [hereinafter Transcript of Removal Proceedings 
Hearing]; see also Oral Decision of the Immigration Judge at 4–5, [name and case number 
redacted] (U.S. Immigration Ct., Baltimore, Feb. 21, 2013) (on file with the Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology) [hereinafter Oral Decision of the Immigration Judge].  This 
description of events is based on the officer’s own sworn testimony and the immigration 
judge’s findings of fact from the hearing. 
16 Transcript of Removal Proceedings Hearing, supra note 15, at 117, 126. 
17 Id. at 126. 
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law-and-order issue rather than a response to a complex web of influences 
such as family, economics, politics, and opportunity.18  As a result, many 
officers have come to understand immigration enforcement as part of their 
general duty to enforce the law.  They may experience satisfaction in 
making more immigration arrests, even if those arrests are not part of their 
law enforcement mandate. 
This motivation to carry out their duties so as to maximize 
immigration arrests takes a toll on these officers’ primary law enforcement 
focus.  The officers in the above examples were mandated to carry out a 
specific task—to screen for terrorism, or to enforce the criminal and traffic 
laws of the state.  Instead of focusing on those tasks, however, the lure of 
the “easy mark” led them to distort (or ignore) their primary jobs in favor of 
increasing immigration apprehensions.  In the process, of course, they also 
engaged in wholesale violations of the constitutional rights of those 
subjected to race-based stops, searches, and interrogations.19 
When the evidentiary fruits of such arrests are passed from state 
officers to federal authorities, they routinely become the basis for removal 
proceedings in immigration court.  The perversity of allowing DHS to 
prosecute removal proceedings by relying on evidence unconstitutionally 
seized by state officers has been pointed out.20  This practice represents a 
revival of the “silver platter doctrine,” which, prior to the 1960 Supreme 
Court case of Elkins v. United States,21 allowed federal criminal authorities 
to rely on evidence illegally seized by state officers, even though that 
evidence could have been excluded if seized by federal officers.22  The 
Court struck down the silver platter doctrine in Elkins and held that 
allowing federal courts to “profit” from evidence that was illegally seized 
by state officers created perverse incentives by tacitly approving illegal 
policing by state officers and discouraging close collaboration by state and 
federal officers.23  These same dynamics and incentives exist in 
contemporary shadow immigration enforcement when neither DHS nor the 
arresting officers are held accountable for constitutional violations. 
 
18 See infra text accompanying notes 153–58. 
19 TSA has been subjected to at least one formal complaint and investigation, Schmidt & 
Lichtblau, supra note 9, and Alamance County faces the prospect of either a consent 
agreement or litigation with DOJ’s Civil Rights Division, DOJ Letter to Alamance County, 
supra note 5, at 10–11. 
20 David Gray et al., The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine, 91 
TEX. L. REV. 7, 32 (2012). 
21 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 208 (1960). 
22 Gray et al., supra note 20. 
23 Elkins, 364 U.S. at 221–22. 
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Shadow enforcement raises qualitatively different civil rights and 
constitutional concerns from those that arise in immigration enforcement 
carried out by DHS officers.  On the one hand, the overlap of the targeted 
population with identifiable racial minorities (most notably Latinos) raises 
special constitutional concerns.  On the other, the “under the table” nature 
of the enforcement incentives, confusion over enforcement authority and 
the utter lack of accountability are also extremely troubling.  Moreover, the 
usual constitutional safeguards that seek to protect the public from biased 
and distorted policing (such as specific regulations; training and discipline 
of officers; and using the exclusionary rule in court proceedings) do not 
serve as effective protection against or deterrents to shadow enforcement 
because existing accountability structures do not adequately account for this 
type of enforcement. 
The goal of this Article is to explore the constitutional dangers created 
by state and local officers conducting shadow immigration enforcement and 
to propose strategies for responding to those dangers.  Part I of the Article 
describes how state and local police and sheriffs have become shadow 
immigration enforcers and provides the concrete constitutional context of 
this enforcement.  Part II analyzes the uniquely heightened constitutional 
risks of shadow enforcement.  Finally, Part III identifies some steps that can 
be taken to safeguard against those pressures. 
I. STATE AND LOCAL POLICE AS SHADOW IMMIGRATION ENFORCERS 
A. THE GROWTH OF SHADOW IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
The past two decades have seen a sea change in the role and 
participation of state and local officers in the enforcement of federal 
immigration law.  The plenary power of the federal government over 
immigration policy and enforcement, unquestioned in the case law for a 
century,24 has been steadily eroded from within by growing practical, day-
to-day coordination between federal and local jurisdictions on immigration 
enforcement.  This coordination is one aspect of a widely noted and 
progressive convergence of criminal and immigration enforcement—what 
 
24 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (“The right to exclude or to 
expel all aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely or upon certain conditions, in war or in 
peace, [is] an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation, 
essential to its safety, its independence and its welfare . . . .”); see also Peter H. Shuck, 
Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 57 (“Probably no 
principle in immigration law is more firmly established, or of greater antiquity, than the 
plenary power of the federal government to regulate immigration.  Equally canonical is the 
corollary notion . . . that . . . the states may not exercise any part of it without an express or 
implied delegation from Washington.”). 
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has come to be known as “crimmigration.”25  In a host of ways, state and 
local officers now participate in gathering and sharing information about the 
immigration status of individuals they encounter, and when DHS may have 
enforcement interests, they facilitate detention and transfer.26  Much of this 
participation is through a constellation of federal programs designed to 
tighten the connections between the criminal and immigration enforcement 
systems. 
The most direct federal endorsement of state and local involvement in 
immigration enforcement is the 287(g) program, which authorizes DHS to 
deputize state and local police and sheriffs to enforce federal immigration 
law.27  Congress authorized this program in 1996,28 but it was not 
implemented until 2002 under the George W. Bush Administration.  Under 
its statutory provisions and the terms of the Memoranda of Agreement 
signed by participating jurisdictions, federal agents must train and supervise 
the local officers, who are then authorized to carry out the same 
enforcement duties as federal immigration officers.29  The 287(g) program 
has been controversial, and advocates in a number of jurisdictions have 
complained about a lack of supervision of and abuses by 287(g) deputized 
officers.30  The DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has reviewed 
 
25 Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 
56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006). 
26 For a detailed description of the growth of coordination between federal, state and 
local authorities, see Maureen A. Sweeney, Fact or Fiction: The Legal Construction of 
Immigration Removal for Crimes, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 47, 71–78 (2010). 
27 The program takes its name from its authorizing statutory provision, § 287(g) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 287, 66 Stat. 163, 
233 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012)). 
28 Illegal Immigration Reform & Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
29 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(2) (2012) (“An agreement under this subsection shall require that 
an officer . . . performing a function under the agreement shall have knowledge of, and 
adhere to, Federal law relating to the function, and shall contain a written certification that 
the officers . . . have received adequate training regarding the enforcement of relevant 
Federal immigration laws.”).  For a description of how the program functions, see Carmen 
Gloria Iguina, Note, Adapting to 287(g) Enforcement: Rethinking Suppression and 
Termination Doctrines in Removal Proceedings in Light of State and Local Enforcement of 
Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 207, 217–19 (2011). 
30 Advocates have complained of abuses in numerous 287(g) jurisdictions, most 
famously in Maricopa County, Arizona.  Federal officials revoked their Memorandum of 
Agreement with Maricopa County on December 15, 2011, after they found evidence of 
discriminatory policing practices against Latinos by the sheriff’s office and its deputized 
287(g) officers.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary 
Napolitano on DOJ’s Finding of Discriminatory Policing in Maricopa County (Dec. 15, 
2011) [hereinafter Napolitano Press Release], available at http://goo.gl/qq6jJJ.  For 
complaints about other jurisdictions, see generally Public Safety and Civil Rights 
Implications of State and Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws: Joint Hearing 
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the program and found significant problems with oversight.31  The program 
has only been implemented in a limited number of jurisdictions 
nationwide,32 and the Barack Obama Administration announced its 
intention in early 2012 to begin shutting down the part of the program 
involving street-level enforcement.33  As of November 2013, the ICE 
website listed only thirty-six active 287(g) jurisdictions, all of which were 
limited to enforcement through local jails.34 
While 287(g) has grabbed more than its share of headlines, however, a 
number of quieter changes have resulted in the implementation of programs 
that have had a much broader impact, routinely drawing state and local 
jurisdictions into immigration enforcement.  In fact, ICE operates a whole 
network of programs under the umbrella of ICE ACCESS, a program 
designed to serve as a comprehensive “toolbox” to help integrate state and 
local police and correctional practices with federal immigration 
 
Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. & Int’l Law, and  
the Subcomm. on the Const., Civil Rights, & Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11–19 (2009) (testimony of immigrants detailing abuses); AM. CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION FOUND. OF GA., THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL PROFILING IN GWINNETT: TIME 
FOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND AN END TO 287(G) (Azadeh Shahshahani ed., 
2010), available at http://goo.gl/3mQ0KE; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUND. OF GA., 
TERROR AND ISOLATION IN COBB: HOW UNCHECKED POLICE POWER UNDER 287(G) HAS TORN 
FAMILIES APART AND THREATENED PUBLIC SAFETY (Azadeh Shahshahani ed., 2009), 
available at http://goo.gl/qq6jJJ; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N.C. ET AL., THE POLICIES 
AND POLITICS OF LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT LAWS: 287(G) PROGRAM IN NORTH 
CAROLINA (2009), available at http://goo.gl/4k4AIf; Ryan Gabrielson & Paul Giblin, 
Reasonable Doubt, EAST VALLEY TRIB. (Ariz.) (2009), http://goo.gl/fkqPZk; Daniel 
Hernandez, Pedro Guzman’s Return, L.A. WKLY. (Aug. 7, 2007), http://goo.gl/qq6jJJ 
(discussing a developmentally disabled U.S. citizen who was mistakenly detained and 
deported to Mexico by officers working under 287(g)).  
31 See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-11-119, THE 
PERFORMANCE OF 287(G) AGREEMENTS FY 2011 UPDATE (2011); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-10-124, THE PERFORMANCE OF 287(G) AGREEMENTS REPORT 
UPDATE (2010). 
32 The American Immigration Council reported that as of October 2012, DHS had 
Memoranda of Agreement with fifty-seven states and localities.  IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR., 
AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, The 287(g) Program: A Flawed and Obsolete Method of 
Immigration Enforcement (Nov. 29, 2012), http://goo.gl/qq6jJJ.  The ICE website indicates 
that as of October 2, 2012, Memoranda of Agreement had been signed with sixty-three 
jurisdictions.  Of those, thirty-five involved officers authorized to carry out their duties 
solely within the jurisdiction’s jails.  See Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority 
Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, ICE.GOV, http://goo.gl/e6yWtS (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Fact Sheet]. 
33 See Alan Gomez, Immigration Enforcement Program to Be Shut Down, USA TODAY 
(Feb. 17, 2012, 3:25 PM), http://goo.gl/tASPhZ. 
34 Fact Sheet, supra note 32. 
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enforcement efforts.35  Among the tools in the box is the Criminal Alien 
Program, which identifies deportable noncitizens in federal, state, and local 
jails and prisons throughout the country.36  The Law Enforcement Support 
Center also provides 24/7 immigration status information to local 
jurisdictions in response to officers’ inquiries,37 largely through access to 
the National Crime Information Center38 databases, which now contain that 
information.39  The National Fugitive Operations Program further has the 
mission of pursuing known at-large criminal aliens and fugitive aliens.40 
The Secure Communities program, another tool which has also had its 
share of controversy,41 mandates that whenever a state or local jurisdiction 
submits an arrestee’s fingerprints to the FBI, those fingerprints will also be 
run through the DHS database to check for immigration violations.42  In 
response to whatever information results, ICE can take enforcement action 
by placing a detainer on the individual.43  The Secure Communities 
 
35 “ACCESS” stands for “Agreements of Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety 
and Security.”  ICE ACCESS, ICE.GOV, http://goo.gl/6hjAGd (last visited Apr. 16, 2014); see 
also Julie L. Myers, ICE ACCESS: A Partnership Approach to Fighting Crime, 75 POLICE 
CHIEF 16, 16 (2008) (written by the former assistant secretary of Homeland Security for ICE). 
36 See Criminal Alien Program, ICE.GOV, http://goo.gl/zsF2Tq (last visited Apr. 16, 2014). 
37 Law Enforcement Support Center, ICE.GOV, http://goo.gl/vG9mll (last visited Apr. 16, 
2014). 
38 See National Crime Information Center, FBI.GOV, http://goo.gl/ZAuoWx (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2014). 
39 See Law Enforcement Support Center, supra note 37. 
40 Fact Sheet: ICE Fugitive Operations Program, ICE.GOV (July 2, 2013), 
http://goo.gl/dMDujl.  The National Fugitive Operations Program (NFOP) has been 
criticized for ignoring its mandate and targeting noncitizens indiscriminately.  MARC R. 
ROSENBLUM & WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42057, INTERIOR 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: PROGRAMS TARGETING CRIMINAL ALIENS 1, 27 (2012).  Of 
those arrested by Fugitive Operations Teams (FOT) between 2003 and 2008, 73% had no 
criminal convictions.  MARGOT MENDELSON ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INST., COLLATERAL 
DAMAGE: AN EXAMINATION OF ICE’S FUGITIVE OPERATIONS PROGRAM 11 (2009).  
41 See, e.g., Kitty Felde, Secure Communities: Controversy Rages Over How 
Deportation Program Affects Public Safety, 893 KPCC S. CAL. PUB. RADIO (June 7, 2011, 
5:35 AM), http://goo.gl/2yXBJZ; Gretchen Gavett, Controversial “Secure Communities” 
Immigration Program Will Be Mandatory by 2013, PBS.ORG (Jan. 9, 2012, 3:01 PM), 
http://goo.gl/bPfF3N; Elizabeth Llorente, Coast to Coast, Unrest over Secure Communities, 
FOX NEWS LATINO (May 14, 2012), http://goo.gl/qoFSen. 
42 Secure Communities, ICE.GOV, http://goo.gl/6CE2sv (last visited Apr. 16, 2014).  For 
a good step-by-step explanation of the Secure Communities process, see U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-708, SECURE COMMUNITIES: CRIMINAL ALIEN REMOVAL 
INCREASED, BUT TECHNOLOGY PLANNING IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED 7–9 (2012). 
43 For a practical description of how immigration detainers are used to secure 
individuals’ transfers from state to federal custody, see PAROMITA SHAH, NAT’L 
IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF NAT’L LAWYERS’ GUILD ET AL., UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRATION 
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program is now activated nationwide,44 and in 2011 and 2012, it accounted 
for roughly 20% of the approximately 400,000 DHS removals for those 
years.45  Since 2008, ICE has spent more than $750 million on Secure 
Communities and identified more than 692,000 individuals for deportation 
through the program.46  Each year, a growing percentage of removals are 
attributed to Secure Communities.47  Since fiscal year 2004, ICE has spent 
about $3.3 billion on efforts to identify and remove individuals with 
convictions.48  In fiscal year 2011, funding for these efforts was $690 
million.49   
In addition to these information sharing and enforcement programs, 
state officers also participate directly with federal officers in joint arrest and 
investigative operations.  Officers sometimes support ICE operations, 
assisting in the execution of a search or arrest warrant.  They also work with 
federal officers in joint task forces targeting drug or gang activity.50 
In recent years, of course, a number of states have also passed their 
own legislation to regulate immigrants within their borders.51  Many of 
 
DETAINERS: AN OVERVIEW FOR STATE DEFENSE COUNSEL (2011), available at 
http://goo.gl/EWVFd9. 
44 ACTIVATED JURISDICTIONS, IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC. (Jan. 22, 2013), http://goo.gl/GsYqTH. 
45 GAO-12-708, supra note 42, at 14 & 15 t.2; see also News Release, FY 2012: ICE 
Announces Year-End Removal Numbers, Highlights Focus on Key Priorities and Issues 
New National Detainer Guidance to Further Focus Resources, U.S. Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement (Dec. 21, 2012), available at http://goo.gl/Y2Ymku (indicating 409,849 
removals for fiscal year 2012); Secure Communities: Monthly Statistics Through September 
30, 2013, ICE.GOV, http://goo.gl/uLixRJ (last visited Apr. 16, 2014) (indicating 83,815 
removals in fiscal year 2012 resulting from Secure Communities). 
46 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-12-64, OPERATIONS OF 
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT’S SECURE COMMUNITIES 1 (2012). 
47 GAO-12-708, supra note 42, at 14.  ICE attributes the following percentages of yearly 
removals to Secure Communities: FY 2009 (4%), FY 2010 (13%), FY 2011 (20%), first half 
of FY 2012 (21%).  Id. at 15. 
48 OIG-12-64, supra note 46, at 2. 
49 Id. 
50 See United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 2007) (involving a joint 
ICE and local police initiative targeting gang and immigration violations); Martinez-
Camargo v. INS, 282 F.3d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing an INS agent and local 
police officers working together in an INS task force); United States v. Gutierrez-Daniez, 
131 F.3d 939, 941 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting a joint INS and local police task force was 
created to target drug crimes and immigration violations); GUIDANCE ON STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS’ ASSISTANCE IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND RELATED MATTERS 1, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://goo.gl/ZnoGVM (last visited Apr. 16, 2014). 
51 On the factors leading to increased state efforts to regulate immigration, see Marisa S. 
Cianciarulo, The “Arizonification” of Immigration Law: Implications of Commerce v. 
Whiting for State and Local Immigration Legislation, 15 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 85, 86–89 
(2012).  For an example of a state law, see Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer & Citizen 
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these laws have sought to enlist the state’s law enforcement officers in 
investigating and reporting immigration status.52  For example, the part of 
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 that the Supreme Court let stand in 2012 requires state 
officers to investigate the immigration status of any person subject to a 
lawful stop or detention if the officers have reason to suspect that person 
may be an immigrant unlawfully present in the United States.53  Since 
Arizona’s law was passed in 2010, five states have passed similar laws, and 
similar bills have been introduced but not passed in thirty-one other states.54  
In 2012, state lawmakers in forty-six states, the District of Columbia, and 
Puerto Rico introduced 983 bills and resolutions related to immigrants and 
refugees.  Approximately 17% of the proposed bills addressed law 
enforcement issues.55 
The cumulative effect of all of these developments has been to 
integrate enforcement of federal immigration law into the day-to-day 
activities of state and local police.  Furthermore, federal authorities have 
 
Protection Act, ALA. CODE §§ 31-13-1 to 31-13-35 (2011) (including a requirement that 
employers check immigration status, prohibiting them from hiring undocumented 
immigrants, and prohibiting undocumented immigrants from enrolling in postsecondary 
education in the state). 
52 See, e.g., H.B. 11-1107, 68th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2011) (including 
proposals to allow law enforcement to make warrantless arrests if they have probable cause 
to believe the subject is removable); S.B. 590, 117th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2011) 
(“A committed offender shall, within a reasonable time, be evaluated regarding . . . the 
citizenship or immigration status of the offender by making a reasonable effort to verify the 
offender’s citizenship or immigration status with the United States Department of Homeland 
Security . . . .”); H.B. 801, 195th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011) (proposing to require 
officers to investigate the immigration status of arrestees whom they suspect of being 
unlawfully present and permitting officers to make warrantless arrests if they suspect an 
individual of a crime that would make the individual removable); S.B. 20, 119th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2011) (“If a law enforcement officer of this State or a political 
subdivision of this State lawfully stops, detains, investigates, or arrests a person for a 
criminal offense, and during the commission of the stop, detention, investigation, or arrest 
the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that the person is unlawfully present in the 
United States, the officer shall make a reasonable effort, when practicable, to determine 
whether the person is lawfully present in the United States, unless the determination would 
hinder or obstruct an investigation.”).  
53 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (West 2012); see also Arizona v. United States, 
132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
54 Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Utah passed similar legislation in 
2011; all have been challenged in court and the states have been prevented from 
implementing the laws in full.  A. ELENA LACAYO, NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, THE WRONG 
APPROACH: STATE ANTI-IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION IN 2011, at 14, 16–17 (Jan. 10, 2012), 
http://goo.gl/DRTTse. 
55 Allison Johnston & Ann Morse, Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in the States 
(Jan.1–Dec. 31, 2012), NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://goo.gl/5tuRXp (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2014) (presenting detailed accounting on the subject). 
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shown a willingness to use these programs to identify and arrest large 
numbers of individuals who have little or no serious criminal involvement 
(despite protestations that the programs are designed to target dangerous 
criminals who threaten communities).56  For example, 28% of Secure 
Communities removals for fiscal year 2010 involved individuals with no 
criminal record whatsoever.57  As a result, state and local police have come 
to realize that even minor traffic violations can now serve as the 
precondition for a possible immigration arrest.  Under the Fourth 
Amendment case Whren v. United States, officers are permitted to engage 
in pretextual traffic enforcement with the purpose of pursuing some other 
law enforcement goal so long as they have probable cause for the traffic 
stop.58  In the immigration context, this opens the door for police to use 
traffic or other low-level crime enforcement to provide the pretext for 
inquiries into individuals’ immigration status. 
These developments have both encouraged state and local police to 
identify civil immigration violations and allowed them to achieve that 
shadow law enforcement goal, in part, through the shadowy pretext of 
traffic or criminal enforcement. 
In Arizona v. United States, the Supreme Court clearly stated its 
approval of free information sharing between federal and local authorities 
regarding individuals’ immigration status, as sanctioned by Congress.59  
This ensures that programs like Secure Communities and CAP will persist, 
and it represents an important line-crossing in our understanding of the 
proper federalism balance in our immigration scheme.  Local officers are 
now involved, albeit indirectly, in federal civil immigration enforcement as 
a routine part of their duties.  Evidence has begun to mount that this shift 
has also opened a Pandora’s box of incentives for unconstitutional and 
racially biased law enforcement. 
 
56 The government’s own numbers show that 37% of Secure Communities arrests in 
fiscal years 2011 to 2012 were based on traffic offenses.  GAO-12-708, supra note 42, at 23.  
In fiscal year 2010, 28% of individuals removed through Secure Communities had no 
criminal convictions, and 49% had been convicted of a Level 2 or 3 offense (misdemeanor).  
MICHELE WASLIN, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, ICE’S ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES AND THE 
FACTORS THAT UNDERMINE THEM 9 (2010), http://goo.gl/hqYx8K.  Only 23% had been 
convicted of a Level 1 offense (aggravated felony or two or more crimes punishable by more 
than one year).  Id. 
57 Id. at 9. 
58 517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996). 
59 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2508 (2012) (“Consultation between federal and state officials is an 
important feature of the immigration system.”). 
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B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF SHADOW ENFORCEMENT 
1. Equal Protection Under Law as a Fundamental American Value 
The rule of law and the nondiscriminatory administration of justice are 
bedrock values of our American system of justice.  They are expressed in 
our laws repeatedly in varied ways.60  The Constitution promises the equal 
protection of laws to all persons in both the Fifth and the Fourteenth 
Amendments, and caselaw establishes that laws categorizing people by race 
are subject to strict scrutiny and must be justified by compelling state 
necessity.61  State laws that discriminate on the basis of nationality are 
likewise subject to strict scrutiny.62  The post-Civil War civil rights statutes 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 represent another expression of our strong 
federal policy against nationality discrimination.63  Numerous other federal 
laws enshrine the same principles of nondiscrimination, including the 
Voting Rights Act,64 the Fair Housing Act,65 and Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act,66 among others. 
This combination of Supreme Court jurisprudence and federal law 
represents strong expressions of our ongoing and formative national 
struggle to fulfill the promises of equality in our founding documents.  
While our national history has been far from smooth and unblemished in 
this regard, the struggle to ensure the full protections and benefits of law to 
 
60 See, e.g., Lucas Guttentag, Discrimination, Preemption, and Arizona’s Immigration 
Law: A Broader View, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 3 (2012) (describing 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as 
reflecting an “entrenched” federal norm against discrimination). 
61 See, e.g., Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[W]e hold today 
that all racial classifications . . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.  
In other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored 
measures that further compelling governmental interests.”). 
62 See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (“[State] classifications 
based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject 
to close judicial scrutiny.”); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954) (excluding 
Mexican-Americans from jury service because of ancestry or national origin violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment).  In contrast, federal laws may discriminate among individuals on 
the basis of nationality due to the federal government’s plenary power over immigration and 
nationality.  See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 86–87 (1976). 
63 Guttentag, supra note 60, at 4–5.  Section 1981 provides that “all persons” shall have 
the same contractual rights and enjoy the “full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings” 
as white citizens, thus outlawing discrimination based on both race and nationality.  42 
U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006).  In Graham, the Court struck down a state law denying welfare to 
lawful permanent resident immigrants on equal protection grounds but also on the grounds 
that the state law conflicted with the nondiscrimination principles of § 1981.  403 U.S. at 
365, 377–78, 380.  
64 Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973bb-1 (2006). 
65 Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2006). 
66 Equal Employment Opportunities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006). 
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all persons is a crucial part of our national identity.  It has been forged 
through the struggles of native peoples, through the Civil War and the end 
of slavery, through the women’s suffrage movement, through the civil 
rights movement, through the efforts to obtain restitution for Japanese-
Americans interned during World War II, and through the ongoing struggle 
to balance security and individual civil rights in the wake of the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001.  This commitment to the full, 
nondiscriminatory rule of law—and the ongoing struggle to bring that ideal 
to fruition—are central to who we are as a nation.  It is precisely the threat 
to that ideal which creates the heat in the heart of the controversy over 
Arizona’s state law, S.B. 1070.  While it was enacted to address 
immigration, S.B. 1070 has been opposed as a law that fosters 
discrimination on the basis of race and national origin.67  The controversy 
over S.B. 1070 highlights many of the concerns raised more generally by 
the participation of state and local law enforcement in immigration 
enforcement. 
2. The Explicit Use of Race and National Origin in Immigration 
Enforcement 
Immigration enforcement engages issues of race and apparent 
nationality in ways that are nuanced, different from criminal law, and not 
widely familiar to law enforcement officers.  The use of race—even in 
criminal enforcement—is far from a simple matter, and courts use varied 
approaches in how they describe the propriety of identifying suspects by 
race.  Courts do allow police officers to consider race in certain 
circumstances—for example, when a racial descriptor is used to describe a 
suspect in a police bulletin.  In those circumstances, police are permitted to 
use race as a factor in stopping possible suspects.68  By the same token, it is 
widely accepted that law enforcement officers may not explicitly use an 
individual’s race itself as a factor that directly raises suspicion of criminal 
behavior.69  The Supreme Court has never recognized the use of race as a 
 
67 See generally Gabriel J. Chin et al., A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona 
Senate Bill 1070, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47, 68 (2010) (explaining that S.B. 1070 may 
actually require racial profiling); Gabriel J. Chin & Kevin R. Johnson, Op-Ed., Profiling’s 
Unlikely Enabler: A High Court Ruling Underpins Ariz. Law, WASH. POST, July 13, 2010, at 
A15 (analyzing concerns with racial profiling in the implementation of S.B. 1070); Russell 
Pearce, Arizona Takes the Lead on Illegal Immigration Enforcement, 20 THE SOCIAL 
CONTRACT 244, 244 (Arizona State Senator—and S.B. 1070 coauthor—Russell Pearce calls 
the concerns of the “open-border, pro-amnesty crowd” concerns of “racial profiling”). 
68 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 535 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir. 2008) (upholding 
probable cause where suspect met a description, including a racial identification). 
69 See, e.g., Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1190–91 (9th Cir. 1996) (vigorously 
rejecting an implication of criminality in the presence of two black men in an area at night). 
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legitimate factor for assessing under the Fourth Amendment whether there 
is a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person 
stopped of criminal activity.  Myriad lower courts have flatly rejected race 
as a relevant indicator of criminal behavior.70 
The same cannot be said categorically with regard to immigration 
enforcement; the law does allow the explicit use of race or apparent 
nationality to establish suspicion in certain circumstances.  In the 1975 case 
of United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,71 the Supreme Court held that 
“apparent Mexican ancestry” could be a relevant factor, among others, in 
developing reasonable suspicion of unlawful immigration status in a stop 
near the Mexican border.  Relying on census statistics showing the numbers 
of citizens and noncitizens of Mexican descent in the area of the arrest, the 
Court said, “The likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an 
alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor . . . .”72  
The Court acknowledged at the same time the burden this placed on native-
born and naturalized citizens who have those same characteristics, and 
warned that even the plenary power of Congress over immigration matters 
“cannot diminish the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens who may be 
mistaken for aliens.”73 
While Brignoni-Ponce held that the sole factor of “apparent Mexican 
ancestry” could not by itself support reasonable suspicion of alienage,74 the 
Court has never disavowed its statement that Mexican appearance could be 
a relevant factor.  As a result of the tension between this statement and 
courts’ concerns about targeting “foreign-seeming” citizens and lawfully 
present noncitizens, the Supreme Court and lower courts have struggled to 
 
70 See, e.g., Farag v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 436, 465–68 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(citing, inter alia, United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 
2000) (rejecting the use of race as not probative of criminality and as inappropriate, and 
tracing history of state and federal court rejection of race as a factor); see also United States 
v. Clay, 640 F.2d 157, 159 (8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Ruiz, 961 F. Supp. 1524, 1532 
(D. Utah 1997); United States v. Hayden, 740 F. Supp. 650, 653 (S.D. Iowa 1989) aff’d sub 
nom. United States v. Jefferson, 906 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1990); People v. Johnson, 478 
N.Y.S.2d 987, 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). 
 It is important to note that racial profiling is still widely practiced in criminal law 
enforcement, for some of the reasons discussed below.  See, e.g., Brown v. City of Oneonta, 
235 F.3d 769, 771 (2d Cir. 2000) (“For better or worse, it is a fact of life in our diverse 
culture that race is used on a daily basis as a shorthand for physical appearance.  This is as 
true in police work as anywhere else.”); see also infra Part I.B.3. 
71 422 U.S. 873, 873, 886–87 (1975). 
72 Id. at 886–87. 
73 Id. at 884. 
74 Id. at 885–86. 
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set meaningful and consistent standards for when and how race can be 
properly considered in immigration enforcement.75 
The year after its decision in Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court 
approved the use of “apparent Mexican ancestry” as a principal criterion for 
secondary inspection referrals at fixed border patrol checkpoints.76  Since 
then, however, many appellate and other lower courts have distinguished or 
questioned the continuing viability of Brignoni-Ponce.  The result is a 
confused and inconsistent state of the law.  For example, twenty-five years 
later, the Ninth Circuit (whose earlier decision the Supreme Court upheld in 
Brignoni-Ponce) distinguished the demographic and statistical conclusions 
of Brignoni-Ponce.  Based on the growth of the Hispanic population in the 
Southwest, the Court wrote: 
[W]e conclude that, at this point in our nation’s history, and given the continuing 
changes in our ethnic and racial composition, Hispanic appearance is, in general, of 
such little probative value that it may not be considered as a relevant factor where 
particularized or individualized suspicion is required.  Moreover, we conclude, for the 
reasons we have indicated, that it is also not an appropriate factor.77 
Demonstrating the confusion in the state of the law, however, the Ninth 
Circuit later held in a case that arose in Montana that Hispanic appearance 
could be a relevant factor because of the relative scarcity of Hispanics in 
that region.78 
Other courts have also called Brignoni-Ponce into question or limited 
its applicability.  The Fifth Circuit has repeatedly refused to acknowledge 
any meaningfully probative relationship between Hispanic appearance and 
 
75 Scholars have also widely criticized Brignoni-Ponce for legitimizing and fostering 
racial profiling in the immigration context.  See, e.g., Brian R. Gallini & Elizabeth L. Young, 
Car Stops, Borders, and Profiling: The Hunt for Undocumented (Illegal?) Immigrants in 
Border Towns, 89 NEB. L. REV. 709, 731–32 (2011); César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, 
La Migra in the Mirror: Immigration Enforcement and Racial Profiling on the Texas 
Border, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 167, 180–81 (2009); Kevin R. Johnson, 
How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. 
L.J. 1005, 1012, 1025 (2010) (pointing out, among other things, that Brignoni-Ponce itself 
demonstrates the imprecision of “apparent Mexican ancestry” in the fact that two of the three 
individuals so identified in the case were, respectively, a U.S. citizen of Puerto Rican origin 
and a Guatemalan woman). 
76 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 563–64 (1976). 
77 United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000); see also 
Hernandez, supra note 75, at 184–85 (describing the number of indicators of 
“suspiciousness” displayed by his own U.S. citizen and lawfully resident Mexican-American 
family on a recent trip). 
78 United States v. Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928, 935 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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unlawful behavior or status.79  Likewise, the Second Circuit noted in dicta 
that a stop based on race (“or some other grossly improper consideration”) 
could qualify as an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment.80  The 
tone of a judge in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico 
conveys the dismissiveness of these courts toward  Brignoni-Ponce: 
“Parenthetically, Agent Torres also testified that the occupants of the 
vehicle ‘appeared to be Hispanic.’  This factor, while not unusual in New 
Mexico, or anywhere in the United States for that matter, certainly is not 
indicia of criminal conduct.  Many citizens of the United States ‘appear to 
be Hispanic.’”81 
Courts have thus held race to be a sometimes-appropriate proxy factor 
in immigration enforcement.  At the same time, they have hesitated to rely 
on it due to its limited probative value and the concerns it raises about the 
Fourth Amendment constitutional burden borne by lawfully present or 
citizen members of targeted racial groups.  Nonetheless, Brignoni-Ponce 
has never been overturned, and it is widely stated that race is an acceptable 
explicit factor in determining suspicion for purposes of immigration 
enforcement.82  Even more importantly, as a matter of practical reality, race 
continues to be commonly used as an identifying characteristic for 
immigration enforcement.  Often, however, it appears as a wolf in 
reasonable suspicion’s clothing. 
The job of an officer enforcing immigration law is to identify and 
monitor noncitizens with regard to whether they have lawful permission to 
remain in the United States.  Unfortunately for authorities, immigration 
status is an invisible quality and not something that an outside observer can 
objectively perceive at a distance.  This invisibility distinguishes 
 
79 See, e.g., United States v. Chavez-Villarreal, 3 F.3d 124, 127 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(“Further, we accord . . . very little [weight] to [the defendant’s] Hispanic appearance; his 
license plates indicate that he was from a state with a substantial Hispanic population.”); 
United States v. Orona-Sanchez, 648 F.2d 1039, 1042 (5th Cir. 1981) (“Nor is there anything 
vaguely suspicious about the presence of persons who appear to be of Latin origin in New 
Mexico where over one-third of the population is Hispanic.”). 
80 Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006). 
81 United States v. Abdon-Limas, 780 F. Supp. 773, 778 (D.N.M. 1991).  Of course, 
many citizens of the United States in fact are Hispanic, and certainly more so now than in 
1975 when Brignoni-Ponce was decided.  The Hispanic population as of April 1, 2010 was 
50.5 million, comprising 16.3% of the nation’s total population.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
OVERVIEW OF RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN 4 (2011).  Most Latinos are native-born 
Americans; 74% are U.S. citizens.  20 FAQs About Hispanics, NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, 
http://goo.gl/uSy9PT (last visited Apr. 21, 2014). 
82 See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 
58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1570–78 (2011); Kristin Connor, Updating Brignoni-Ponce: A 
Critical Analysis of Race-Based Immigration Enforcement, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y 567, 614 (2008); Johnson, supra note 75, at 1030. 
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warrantless immigration enforcement in an important way from the typical 
warrantless traffic or criminal arrest, which is based on an officer’s 
observation of prohibited behavior. 
As a result, immigration enforcement agents commonly rely either on 
circumstantial evidence or on proxy characteristics to support reasonable 
suspicion that individuals are (1) non-U.S. citizens, and (2) do not have 
legal permission to be in the United States.  In Brignoni-Ponce, the 
Supreme Court listed the types of circumstantial factors that can give rise to 
reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence,83 including characteristics of the 
area of the encounter,84 driver behavior,85 and characteristics of an 
individual’s vehicle.86  In nontraffic cases, courts have also considered such 
factors as association with a known employer of unauthorized workers.87 
More subjective—but nonetheless common—is the use of personal 
behavior as a circumstantial indicator of unlawful status.  In reality, these 
behaviors often can be indicators of nervousness, used as a proxy for 
indicators of unlawful status.  Some courts have held that nervousness 
should not be given much weight as such a proxy.88  Some courts have 
simply addressed the indicators of nervousness individually, and the 
 
83 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884–85 (1975) (citing numerous cases 
that included the listed factors). 
84 Id.; see also United States v. Garcia, 942 F.2d 873, 876–77 (5th Cir. 1991) (approving 
the use of the stop’s proximity to the border and the fact that a highway was commonly used 
in smuggling as factors); United States v. Manzo-Jurado, 457 F.3d 928, 935 n.6 (9th Cir. 
2006) (noting the relative scarcity of Hispanics in the region). 
85 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884–85; see also United States v. Quintana-Garcia, 343 
F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir. 2003) (allowing driver’s reduced speed and act of pulling over 
before border patrol had turned on his patrol lights as factors); United States v. Montero-
Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1130, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (U-turn on a highway after passing sign 
indicating upcoming border checkpoint); United States v. Rodriguez-Sanchez, 23 F.3d 1488, 
1493 (9th Cir. 1994) (abrupt exit from border checkpoint and weaving in and out of lanes); 
Garcia, 942 F.2d at 875–76 (high-speed attempt to evade officers). 
86 Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885 (stating that “officers say that certain station wagons, 
with large compartments for fold-down seats or spare tires, are frequently used for 
transporting concealed aliens” and “[t]he vehicle may appear to be heavily loaded, it may 
have an extraordinary amount of passengers,” or the officers may observe people hiding); 
see also United States v. Chavez-Chavez, 205 F.3d 145, 149 (5th Cir. 2000) (approving 
agents’ use of van types commonly used in smuggling as a factor). 
87 See, e.g., Lee v. INS, 590 F.2d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 1979); see also In re King & Yang, 
16 I. & N. Dec. 502, 504–05 (B.I.A. 1978). 
88 Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1446 (9th Cir. 1994) (disregarding 
nervousness as factor for suspicion); United States v. Hernandez-Alvarado, 891 F.2d 1414, 
1418–19 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding no reasonable suspicion where one of the factors was 
“nervous demeanor of both the defendant and his passengers as they sat in the truck”); 
United States v. Ortega-Serrano, 788 F.2d 299, 302 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that nervousness 
is “not unusual”). 
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meaning attributed to them has varied.  For example, courts have found the 
failure to make eye contact to be a reasonable basis for suspicion,89 while 
others have refused to consider that a reliable indicator of unlawful 
behavior.90 
Finally, and most problematically, officers often use physical or 
linguistic characteristics of the person as a direct proxy for “foreignness”—
that is, for noncitizen status.91  This assumes, of course, a certain 
understanding of what characteristics are “foreign,” a problematic concept, 
especially from the viewpoint of citizens who maintain physical, linguistic, 
and cultural ties to their countries of ancestry.  The other consistent problem 
with the use of race or apparent nationality as a proxy for citizenship status 
is that it fails to address the second part of the required reasonable 
suspicion: unlawful status.  The simple fact that an individual may be a 
noncitizen does not indicate whether that person is lawfully in the United 
States, and lawfully present noncitizens are as burdened by race-targeted 
enforcement as are citizens.92 
3. The Persistence of Race as a Factor in Law Enforcement 
It is difficult to know exactly how often race and language motivate a 
law enforcement stop.  As noted above, few judges seem comfortable 
upholding such a basis for suspicion of unlawful behavior or status, even in 
immigration proceedings.  Officers often give other reasons for stopping an 
individual, even where that individual alleges that the motivation was 
 
89 E.g., Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1136 (calling the consideration of eye contact 
“highly subjective” (quoting United States v. Robert L., 874 F.2d 701, 703 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
90 Ortega-Serrano, 788 F.2d at 302 (“No weight whatsoever attaches to the rear 
passengers’ refusal look at [the officer].” (citing United States v. Pacheco, 617 F.2d 84, 86 
(5th Cir. 1980)); see also United States v. Olivares-Pacheco, 633 F.3d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 
2011) (giving the passengers’ avoidance of eye contact no weight). 
91 Scholars have noted a “historical feature of U.S. immigration law—the government’s 
explicit employment of race as a proxy for citizenship.”  Carbado & Harris, supra note 82, at 
1545; see also Farm Labor Org. Comm. v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 308 F.3d 523, 540 
(6th Cir. 2002) (finding that the inability to speak English may be an acceptable reason for 
suspicion of alienage). 
92 See, e.g., Doris Marie Provine & Roxanne Lynn Doty, The Criminalization of 
Immigrants as a Racial Project, 27 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 261, 269–70 (2011) (describing 
a disproportionate rise in arrests of lawfully present Latinos resulting from partnerships 
between ICE and local police); Mary Romero, Racial Profiling and Immigration Law 
Enforcement: Rounding Up of Usual Suspects in the Latino Community, 32 CRITICAL SOC. 
447, 463 (2006) (describing local immigration enforcement in Arizona characterized by “(1) 
discretionary stops based on ethnicity and class; (2) use of intimidation to demean and 
subordinate persons stopped; (3) restricting the freedom of movement of Mexicans but not 
others in the same vicinity; (4) reinforced stereotypes of Mexican as ‘alien,’ ‘foreign,’ 
inferior and criminal; and (5) limited access to fair and impartial treatment before the law”). 
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race.93  An individual faces difficulty in proving what went on in the 
officer’s head during the stop-and-arrest.  Moreover, gathering the 
extensive proof needed to show definitively what is occurring in law 
enforcement trends is equally difficult. 
Nonetheless, scholars and advocates maintain that many police and 
other officers consistently use race as a proxy for unlawfulness, in both the 
immigration and criminal contexts.94  Recent DOJ Civil Rights Division 
investigations have found rampant racial profiling and biased police 
practices against Latinos in jurisdictions as far-flung and varied as 
Maricopa County, Arizona (where Phoenix is located); the town of East 
Haven, Connecticut; and Alamance County, North Carolina (a rural county 
northwest of Raleigh).95  In all three cases, DOJ used statistical and other 
investigative techniques to find that Latinos were targeted because of their 
 
93 See, e.g., Carrie L. Arnold, Note, Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement: State 
and Local Agreements to Enforce Federal Immigration Law, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 113, 136 & 
n.209 (2007) (“Immigration officers are familiar with the case law and are experienced 
enough to create prefabricated profiles that will satisfy courts that their stops were not based 
solely upon race or ethnic appearance.” (citing cases where the recurrence of word-for-word 
descriptions by border patrol agents led courts to suspect a recycled profile for reasonable 
suspicion justifications)). 
94 See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration 
Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675, 698 (2000) (“Contending that the U.S. government 
regularly violates the wide latitude afforded it by the Supreme Court, plaintiffs in many 
lawsuits allege that the Border Patrol relies almost exclusively on race in making 
immigration stops.”); id. at 706–07 (endorsing a 1985 observation as still accurate: “‘While 
[immigration authorities] cannot in theory question people on the basis of racial or ethnic 
appearance alone, they in fact do so consistently . . . .’” (quoting ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT 
JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ALIENS 100 (1985)); Floyd D. 
Weatherspoon, Racial Profiling of African-American Males: Stopped, Searched, and 
Stripped of Constitutional Protection, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 439, 439–40 (2004) (“Every 
African-American male in this country who drives a vehicle, or has traveled by bus or plane, 
either knowingly or unknowingly has been the victim of racial profiling by law enforcement 
officials. . . .  On the basis of race and gender, governmental officials have devised a profile 
of the typical criminal: black and male.”).  See generally R. Richard Banks, Essay, Racial 
Profiling and Antiterrorism Efforts, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1201 (2004) (discussing various 
ways that law enforcement uses race and whether those constitute profiling); Samuel R. 
Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the 
Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651 (2002) (considering a statistical analysis of police records 
and concluding that Maryland State Police engaged in racial profiling in traffic stops on I-95 
between 1995 and 2000, targeting black and Hispanic drivers). 
95 See generally DOJ Letter to Alamance County, supra note 6; Letter from Thomas E. 
Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., to Joseph Maturo, 
Jr., Mayor of East Haven, Conn. (Dec. 19, 2011) [hereinafter DOJ Letter to East Haven], 
available at http://goo.gl/Sqm2og; Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., to Bill Montgomery, Cnty. Att’y, Maricopa 
County (Dec. 15, 2011) [hereinafter DOJ Letter to Maricopa County], available at 
http://goo.gl/EqEV9y. 
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race for dramatically heightened traffic and other enforcement actions.  
DOJ concluded that Latino drivers were four to ten times more likely to be 
stopped than non-Latino drivers96 and that the increased stops were 
intended to facilitate immigration enforcement.97 
Studies of cooperative federal–state immigration programs also 
indicate that race continues to influence how that enforcement is conducted.  
The Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Law and Social Policy at 
University of California, Berkeley School of Law conducted a review of the 
demographics of 375 arrests in the Secure Communities program.98  The 
researchers found discrepancies between the demographics of those arrested 
and those in the population at large, which indicate that those targeted by 
Secure Communities overwhelmingly fit the profile of a young Latino 
man.99  For example, though previous research has shown that 57% of the 
undocumented population in the United States is male,100 93% of the 
sample arrested through Secure Communities was male.101  Even assuming 
that men may be more likely to commit crime than women, this number far 
surpasses the 75% of arrests tracked by the FBI nationwide that involve 
men.102  Likewise, while 77% of the undocumented population is estimated 
to be from Latin America,103 93% of the sample arrested by Secure 
Communities was Latino.104  The authors also noted that, despite the 
government’s continued insistence that the program is aimed at serious 
 
96 Latino drivers in Maricopa County were four to nine times more likely to be stopped 
than non-Latinos, and Latino drivers in Alamance County were four to ten times more likely 
to be stopped.  DOJ Letter to Alamance County, supra note 95, at 3; DOJ Letter to Maricopa 
County, supra note 95, at 3. 
97 DOJ Letter to Alamance County, supra note 6, at 6 (“[D]eputies understand that they 
should target Latinos with their discretionary enforcement actions and bring them into the 
Alamance County Jail to be run through immigration databases . . . .”); id. at 8 (“Sheriff 
Johnson often justifies ACSO’s activities by citing his desire to combat illegal 
immigration . . . .”). 
98 AARTI KOHLI ET AL., CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON LAW & SOC. POLICY, 
SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 
4 (2011), http://goo.gl/8AeiSj. 
99 Id. at 6. 
100 Id. at 5 (citing MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES 
OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE U.S.: JANUARY 2010, at 5 
(2011), available at http://goo.gl/WYxKP4. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. (citing FBI data on arrests from 2009).  
103 Id. at 5 (citing JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE SIZE AND 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S.: ESTIMATES 
BASED ON THE MARCH 2005 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 5 (2006), available at 
http://goo.gl/0PdmlI). 
104 Id. at 5. 
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criminals, only a quarter of the individuals they sampled were charged in 
removal proceedings with “removal based on a criminal conviction.”105 
Other reviews of Secure Communities statistics demonstrate that high 
percentages of the program’s arrestees have little or no criminal record, 
raising the specter that these individuals are targeted because of their race.  
A recent study by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) found that 
56% of those arrested nationwide through Secure Communities had either 
no criminal conviction or had been convicted of the lowest level 
misdemeanor.106 
Some jurisdictions have particularly high rates of noncriminal 
deportations.  In Louisiana, for example, from when Secure Communities 
began in November 2009 until April 30, 2011, 69.9% of arrestees had no 
criminal record at all, and another 15.6% were convicted of minor 
offenses.107  DHS’s own Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) 
has identified racial profiling as an area of concern for local law 
enforcement participating in Secure Communities; as of July 13, 2012, 
CRCL was preparing a training video for local officers on how to avoid 
racial profiling.108  At that time, CRCL was responding to four complaints 
of law enforcement abuses in connection with Secure Communities.  All 
four complaints alleged criminal arrests that served as a pretext for an 
immigration investigation.109 
The 287(g) program has also been implicated in repeated complaints 
of racial profiling and discriminatory enforcement.  Both Maricopa County 
and Alamance County are 287(g) jurisdictions, and the DOJ investigations 
in both counties found their programs to include racial profiling and race-
based misuse of police power.110  Concerns about how 287(g) agreements 
are implemented go far beyond these counties, however.  OIG and GAO 
reviews of the program have found numerous problems with federal 
oversight of 287(g)-authorized officers.  As detailed in the March 2010 OIG 
report, a number of the jurisdictions participating in the program had 
histories of racial profiling before they were approved for 287(g) delegation 
 
105 Id. at 6. 
106 GAO REPORT 12-708, supra note 42, at 17 (noting that 26% had no conviction and 
30% were convicted of offenses with maximum punishment of less than one year). 
107 NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, SECURE COMMUNITIES 3 (2011), available at 
http://goo.gl/RH1QAG. 
108 GAO REPORT 12-708, supra note 42, at 38, 39 n.49 (“These materials are optional 
and provided free of charge, and are not required as part of state or local law enforcement 
training.”). 
109 Id. at 43. 
110 Napolitano Press Release, supra note 30; DOJ Letter to Alamance County, supra note 
6, at 6 (explaining the role that access to immigration databases through the 287(g) program 
played in the systematic racial profiling and targeting of Latinos for disproportionate arrest). 
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authority, and DHS had no mechanism for gathering or assessing this 
information when a jurisdiction applied for authorization.111  GAO found in 
2009 that more than half of the jurisdictions it contacted during its audit 
reported that community members expressed concerns about racial profiling 
in connection with 287(g) authority.112 
Racial profiling and other abuses are also serious concerns in criminal 
and traffic law enforcement.  The history of racial discrimination in this 
country has included and continues to include a long and deep story of 
troubled relations between members of racial minorities and law 
enforcement.  The inherent vagueness in reasonable suspicion and probable 
cause standards113 make enforcing them notoriously difficult, subjective, 
and susceptible to after-the-fact construction by officers who are challenged 
on the basis for their arrests.114  In addition, the many exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings make the rule a less-than-robust 
Fourth Amendment defender, even where there may be impermissible 
factors, such as race, at play.  Most notable among those exceptions is 
Whren’s approval of pretextual enforcement, which can mask nefarious 
motives, such as race.115 
 
111 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-10-63, THE 
PERFORMANCE OF 287(G) AGREEMENTS 22–23 (2010), available at http://goo.gl/JmeiTe. 
112 Id. (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-109, IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT: BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS 6 (2009)). 
113 The Supreme Court has recognized that reasonable suspicion is “somewhat abstract,” 
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002), and that it is an “elusive concept,” United 
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). 
114 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 75, at 1029 (“[O]fficers can easily strengthen their 
reasonable suspicion for an interrogation after they have begun talking to an individual . . . .  
It is easy to come up with the necessary articulable facts after the fact. . . .  [This] is referred 
to as ‘canned p.c.’ (probable cause).” (quoting Edwin Harwood, Arrests Without Warrant: 
The Legal and Organizational Environment of Immigration Law Enforcement, 17 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 505, 531 (1984))); see also Olmedo-Monroy v. INS, 917 F.2d 1307, 1307 
(9th Cir. 1990).  In Olmedo-Monroy, the petitioner alleging alleged that border patrol 
stopped him solely because he appeared to be Hispanic, but officials testified and the judge 
accepted as true that the officials approached him for “other reasons.”  Id. 
115 United States v. Whren, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“We think these cases foreclose 
any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual 
motivations of the individual officers involved . . . .  Subjective intentions play no role in 
ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”); see also Johnson, supra note 75, at 
1075 (“[T]he Whren Court made any challenge to a pretextual stop close to impossible under 
the Fourth Amendment when the stop was based primarily on race.”).  See generally David 
A. Harris, Essay, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court 
and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997) (discussing racial 
profiling and pretextual stops in Colorado, Florida, Illinois, and Maryland). 
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Scholars and advocates lament the ineffective defense of Fourth 
Amendment guarantees, and many assert that racial profiling is alive and 
well in our nation’s criminal law enforcement.116  Courts, too, recognize the 
ongoing problem as one of great significance.  Recently, a federal district 
court ruled that the New York City police department’s implementation of 
its “stop and frisk” policy, which involved over 4.4 million stops between 
2004 and 2012, resulted in mass violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights of the city’s minorities and constituted a policy of 
“indirect racial profiling.”117  Of those stops, more than 52% were of black 
people and 31% were of Latinos, while only 10% were of whites.118  These 
racial disparities in the rates of citizen–officer encounters persisted, despite 
an earlier lawsuit settlement that required several measures designed to 
remedy racial profiling119 and despite other police actions to understand and 
reduce race-based enforcement.120 
DOJ’s investigation of and actions against both the Maricopa County 
and the Alamance County Sheriff’s Offices also reveal other glaring law 
enforcement abuses, not just in the implementing immigration related 
programs, but also in carrying out their general policing duties.  DOJ 
investigators found widespread abuse, including racial profiling, unlawful 
stops and arrests, uses of excessive force, retaliation for complaints, 
 
116 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 75, at 1076 (“Today, we find ourselves in a situation in 
which African-Americans and Latina/os, as well as Arabs and Muslims, claim that racial 
profiling is endemic to modern criminal and immigration enforcement.”).  See generally 
Gross & Barnes, supra note 94; Reginald T. Shuford, Any Way You Slice It: Why Racial 
Profiling is Wrong, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 371 (1999).  Amnesty International 
estimates that in the United States, blacks suffer racial profiling at a rate of 47%, Latinos at a 
rate of 23%, and Asians at a rate of 11%.  AMNESTY INT’L, THREAT AND HUMILIATION: 
RACIAL PROFILING, DOMESTIC SECURITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1, tbl.1 
(2004), available at http://goo.gl/hui2tR.  For examples of community organizing against 
racial profiling, see Racial Profiling, ACLU, http://goo.gl/uHvLaA (last visited Apr. 16, 
2014) (“Racial profiling continues to be a prevalent and egregious form of discrimination in 
the United States.”); COMMUNITIES UNITED FOR POLICE REFORM, http://goo.gl/qS3vlr (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2014) (describing itself as a community organization dedicated to ending 
discriminatory policing in New York). 
117 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 555, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also 
Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 
2013, at A1. 
118 Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 559  The U.S. Census Bureau shows that in 2010, blacks 
represented 25.5% of the population of New York City, whites represented 44.0%, and 
Latinos represented 28.6%.  State & County Quick Facts: New York City, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://goo.gl/rKklHh (last visited Apr. 16, 2014). 
119 See Floyd, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 609–10. 
120 See, e.g., GREG RIDGEWAY, RAND CORP., ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE 
NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT’S STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK PRACTICES (2007), available 
at http://goo.gl/q5NoMf. 
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discrimination against non-English speakers, and failures to investigate sex 
crimes.121 
The reality of unchecked racial profiling in both criminal and 
immigration enforcement is an important piece of context in which we must 
consider the growing phenomenon of shadow immigration enforcement. 
4. The Supreme Court on State and Local Officer Involvement in 
Immigration Enforcement 
In this context, the Supreme Court looked at Arizona’s formal federal–
state cooperation.  That case, in turn, provides important context for 
considering state and local participation in shadow immigration 
enforcement.  Though the Court encouraged information sharing between 
state and federal authorities, it nonetheless also clearly showed concern 
about the problematic edges of state and local police’s participation in 
immigration enforcement.122  It took pains to limit that participation and to 
raise some flags about possible dangers of shadow immigration 
enforcement. 
To begin, the Court made a point of stating that state and local officers 
have no direct authority to enforce federal civil immigration law: “Federal 
law specifies limited circumstances in which state officers may perform an 
immigration officer’s functions.”123  The Court went on to detail these 
limited circumstances, including under formal 287(g) agreements, an 
imminent mass influx of aliens off the coast, and in cases of smuggling.124  
The Court stated again, “Congress has put in place a system in which state 
officers may not make warrantless arrests of aliens based on possible 
removability except in specific, limited circumstances,” and held that 
Arizona’s attempt to give its officers the authority to make warrantless 
arrests for immigration violations creates “an obstacle to the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress.”125 
Where it declined to forbid state officers from inquiring into 
immigration status under the Arizona state law, the Court did so only with 
the limitations described in the law: in the context of a lawful detention on 
some other ground, and where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is 
an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States.126  The Court further 
 
121 DOJ Letter to Maricopa County, supra note 95, at 2–5. 
122 See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2504 (2012). 
123 Id. at 2496. 
124 Id. at 2506 (noting the authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1324 “to arrest for bringing in and 
harboring certain aliens”). 
125 Id. at 2507. 
126 Id. at 2509. 
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detailed three state provision limitations, which it was willing to presume 
that Arizona would honor in implementing the law.  Two of these 
limitations prohibit the improper police use of race, color, or national origin 
and require that the provisions be implemented in a way that is consistent 
with federal immigration and civil rights law.127 
The Court also identified some possible areas of constitutional 
concern, including Fourth Amendment protection.  It stated that 
“[d]etaining individuals solely to verify their immigration status would raise 
constitutional concerns” and cited cases addressing the Fourth 
Amendment.128  It expressed concern that officers have proper grounds for 
arrest: “If the police stop someone based on nothing more than possible 
removability, the usual predicate for an arrest is absent.”129  It further 
emphasized the importance of specific officer training on immigration 
enforcement, noting with approval that immigration warrants should be 
“executed by federal officers who have received training in the enforcement 
of immigration law.”130  The Court even went so far as to signal that it 
would entertain future challenges to the law on the basis of these concerns.  
It stated: “This opinion does not foreclose other preemption and 
constitutional challenges to the law as interpreted and applied after it goes 
into effect.”131 
So what caused the Court to go to such lengths to express concern 
about state officers inquiring into immigration status?  The Court 
mentioned the Fourth Amendment and preemption, but the heart of the 
controversy over state laws like Arizona’s S.B. 1070 is undoubtedly the 
danger that they will invite the improper use of race in law enforcement and 
will facilitate official race-based harassment of Latinos.  In short, the 
Court’s concern flowed from the threat of policing that discriminates on the 
basis of race or national origin.132 
 
127 Id. at 2507–08 (“First, a detainee is presumed not to be an alien unlawfully present in 
the United States if he or she provides a valid Arizona driver’s license or similar identification.  
Second, officers ‘may not consider race, color or national origin . . . except to the extent 
permitted by the United States [and] Arizona Constitution[s].’  Third, the provisions must be 
‘implemented in a manner consistent with federal law regulating immigration, protecting the 
civil rights of all persons and respecting the privileges and immunities of United States 
citizens.’” (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-105(L) (2012))). 
128 Id. at 2509 (citing Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 784 (2009); Illinois v. 
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). 
129 Id. at 2505. 
130 Id. at 2506. 
131 Id. at 2510. 
132 Justice Samuel Alito identified civil liberties concerns and the risk that the law would 
sweep too widely and lead to detentions of those lawfully in the country.  Id. at 2529 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (“[T]here is no denying that enforcement of § 2(B) [mandating state officers to 
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II. UNIQUE CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS WITH SHADOW IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT 
A. HEIGHTENED RISK OF CONSTITUTIONAL ABUSES 
1. Targeting Racial and Other Vulnerable Minorities 
Shadow immigration enforcement raises heightened civil liberties 
concerns because of the very significant overlap between the targeted 
population of noncitizens and identifiable racial minority groups, primarily 
Latinos and Asians.  Estimates from the Pew Hispanic Center show that 
approximately 80% of unauthorized immigrants came from Mexico and 
other parts of Latin America in 2010.133  Asians now make up 
approximately 11% of the undocumented population,134 and are 
significantly concentrated in a few states.135 
Because the undocumented population overlaps with easily 
identifiable racial minority groups, civil liberties questions are broached 
with extra caution.  The history of race relations in the United States has 
been troubled, to say the least, and our equal protection jurisprudence 
recognizes this by subjecting categories based on race to strict scrutiny, 
requiring them to serve a compelling governmental purpose.136  Given the 
 
investigate immigration status in some circumstances] will multiply the occasions on which 
sensitive Fourth Amendment issues will crop up.  These civil-liberty concerns, I take it, are at 
the heart of most objections to § 2(B).  Close and difficult questions will inevitably arise as to 
whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that a person who is stopped for some 
other reason entered the country illegally, and there is a risk that citizens, lawful permanent 
residents, and others who are lawfully present in the country will be detained.”). 
133 JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR., UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT 
POPULATION: NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS, 2010, at 11 (2011), available at 
http://goo.gl/NON1g1 (showing a total of 81%: 58% from Mexico and 23% from the rest of 
Latin America). 
134 Id. 
135 ELIZABETH M. HOEFFEL ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE ASIAN POPULATION: 2010, 
at 8 (2012), available at http://goo.gl/NcvXzL (noting that nearly three-fourths of all Asians 
lived in ten states). 
136 Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (“Under strict scrutiny, the government 
has the burden of proving that racial classifications are narrowly tailored measures that further 
compelling governmental interests.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[A]ll racial classifications, imposed by 
whatever federal, state, or local government actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under 
strict scrutiny.”); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (“Racial and 
ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial 
examination.”); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions 
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.  That is not to say 
that all such restrictions are unconstitutional.  It is to say that courts must subject them to the 
most rigid scrutiny.”); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) 
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connections between immigration and race, the same history and principles 
support heightened vigilance with regard to civil rights concerns for 
immigration enforcement. 
Courts have also recognized a heightened concern for discrimination 
by state actors on the basis of nationality, arising from the identity of 
noncitizens as a “discrete and insular minority” vulnerable to 
discrimination.137  Though equal protection jurisprudence has given 
deference to distinctions made by the federal government with regard to 
noncitizens,138 it has applied strict scrutiny to state efforts to enforce 
distinctions based on citizenship or nationality.139  This is explicitly because 
“[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ 
minority . . . for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is 
appropriate.”140  These concerns certainly apply in the context of 
immigration enforcement, as the target is a subset of noncitizens. 
Noncitizens, as such, are both politically and procedurally 
disadvantaged and therefore vulnerable.  As noncitizens, they are 
categorically disenfranchised in our political system, which does not accord 
them the vote.141  This restricts their access to the political process.  
Furthermore, as relative newcomers, noncitizens are less likely than U.S. 
citizens to be familiar with other ways to challenge abusive treatment, such 
as police complaint procedures, equal protection lawsuits, and the like.  
Finally, the very context of immigration enforcement heightens noncitizens’ 
vulnerability as a procedural matter.  Those who are picked up in 
immigration enforcement are subject to the significant limitations of the 
 
(“There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when 
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as 
those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be 
embraced within the Fourteenth.”). 
137 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). 
138 This deference has been grounded in the doctrine that the federal government has 
plenary power over matters involving immigration and immigrants.  See, e.g., Mathews v. 
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81–82 (1976). 
139 See, e.g., Graham, 403 U.S. at 372 (recognizing the federal government’s broad 
constitutional authority with regard to immigration but striking down state attempts to limit 
welfare benefits on the basis of citizenship). 
140 Id. at 372 (citing Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152–53 & 152 n.4).  Though 
heightened scrutiny has been applied directly to noncitizens who are lawfully in the country, 
the concerns for any foreign-born person as a member of a discrete and insular minority are 
the same regardless of the individual’s immigration status. 
141 Simon Thompson, Voting Rights: Earned or Entitled?, HARV. POL. REV. (Dec. 3, 2010, 
11:47 PM), http://goo.gl/vkpslF (noting that noncitizens have not been allowed to vote in the 
United States since Arkansas, the last state to do so, banned noncitizen voting in 1926). 
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civil removal process.  They are often detained142 and are put into an 
administrative hearing system where courts have not yet recognized any 
right to appointed counsel.143  In fiscal year 2011, 49% of individuals in 
immigration court were not represented by counsel.144  Furthermore, once 
they are detained, DHS has the discretion to transfer individuals anywhere 
in the country during the course of their removal proceedings.145  These 
factors combine to make it very procedurally and practically difficult for 
individuals in removal proceedings to pursue actions challenging the 
circumstances of their arrests, however egregious those circumstances 
might be.146 
All of these characteristics of noncitizens combine to make them a 
discrete, identifiable minority that is particularly vulnerable to abuse and ill-
equipped to challenge mistreatment through traditional means. 
2. A Highly Charged Political Atmosphere 
Immigration is currently one of the most highly charged political 
issues in the United States.147  This is perhaps not surprising in an era of 
 
142 Sixty-two percent of DHS apprehensions nationwide result in detention.  KOHLI ET 
AL., supra note 98, at 7 (citing DHS statistics).  A study of the Secure Communities program 
found that 83% of those apprehended through that program were detained.  Id. 
143 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2012) (“[T]he alien shall have the privilege of being 
represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing . . . .” 
(emphasis added)).  Some federal circuits have recognized a due process right to counsel at 
the individual’s expense; however, there is no appointed counsel for those who cannot afford 
an attorney.  See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Due Process and Immigrant 
Detainee Prison Transfers: Moving LPRs to Isolated Prisons Violates Their Right to 
Counsel, 21 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 17, 40 n.165 (2011) (collecting cases).  Though some 
courts have discussed a theoretical possibility that appointment of counsel could be required 
to ensure fundamental fairness in a given case, no court has recognized a general right to 
appointed counsel.  Id. (citing Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 568 (6th Cir. 1975).  
In Aguilera-Enriquez, the Sixth Circuit held: “The test for whether due process requires the 
appointment of counsel for an indigent alien is whether, in a given case, the assistance of 
counsel would be necessary to provide fundamental fairness—the touchstone of due 
process.”  516 F.2d at 568 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
144 EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2011 
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, at G1 (2012), available at http://goo.gl/gvLQBL. 
145 See A Costly Move, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 14, 2011), http://goo.gl/lhYBQO 
(noting that in 2009, 52% of detainees were transferred at least once). 
146 See generally García Hernández, supra note 143 (discussing the full range of factors). 
147 See, e.g., Cianciarulo, supra note 51, at 90–96 (discussing many of the arguments 
opposing immigration as well as states’ frustration with federal paralysis on the issue); 
Virginia Martinez et al., A Community Under Siege: The Impact of Anti-Immigrant Hysteria 
on Latinos, 2 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 101, 113 (2008) (“The intense economic pressure caused 
by the current recession and the lasting impact of 9/11 have created a resurgence in anti-
immigrant sentiment, demonstrated by an increase in the number of hate groups.”).  For a 
more recent example of the immigration debate’s prominence in politics and the media, see, 
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economic crisis and demographic change.  Anti-immigrant sentiment is 
predictably high in times of economic pressure,148 though scholars and 
economists debate the actual economic impact of immigration.149  The face 
of the country has also changed demographically in recent decades, and 
many traditionally low-immigration states and localities are finding 
themselves host to a growing population of immigrants and second- and 
third-generation descendants of immigrants.150  In 2011, for the first time, 
“minority,” nonwhite births outnumbered white births in the United 
States.151 
It is also undoubtedly true that political parties and politicians in recent 
years have deliberately—and perhaps cynically—used immigration to 
motivate their political bases and differentiate themselves from their 
opponents.152  The result is that immigration has become a deeply divisive 
 
for example, Editorial, Mr. Obama Feels the Heat, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2014, at A20 
(“Republicans look at immigrants and see criminal invaders.  Democrats see a promising 
voting bloc.  Mr. Obama sees a political headache.”); Emmarie Huetteman & Julia Preston, 
Immigration Activists End Fast on the National Mall, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2013, at A22. 
148 See generally Jack Citrin et al., Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The 
Role of Economic Motivations, 59 J. POL. 858 (1997) (discussing the connection between 
and history of anti-immigrant policies and economic downturns). 
149 See, e.g., Michael A. Olivas, Preempting Preemption: Foreign Affairs, State Rights, 
and Alienage Classifications, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 217, 227 (1994) (“[A] fair review of all the 
evidence shows that undocumented aliens are, by the most reliable studies, a net gain for the 
economy, even if not for the polity . . . .”); Larry J. Obhof, Comment, The Irrationality of 
Enforcement? An Economic Analysis of U.S. Immigration Law, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
163, 180 (2002) (arguing that the negative effects of immigration are “ambiguous and 
unsubstantiated” while the “benefits are established and substantial”). 
150 See Bill Ong Hing, Answering Challenges of the New Immigrant-Driven Diversity: 
Considering Integration Strategies, 40 BRANDEIS L.J. 861, 862–68 (2002) (discussing how 
immigration, particularly that of Latino and Asian immigrants, has impacted the census). 
151 Sabrina Tavernise, Whites Account for Under Half of Births in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, 
May, 17, 2012, at A1. 
152 See, e.g., Rubio to Latino Leaders: Immigration Issue a Divisive Political Tool, 
TAMPA BAY ONLINE, http://goo.gl/sQxUfH (updated Mar. 18, 2013, 6:37 PM) (quoting 
Senator Marco Rubio as saying, “As long as this issue of immigration is a political pingpong 
that each side uses to win elections and influence votes, I’m telling you it won’t get solved.  
There are too many people who have concluded that this issue unresolved is more powerful.  
They want it to stay unresolved.”); see also Omar Baddar, Immigration a Contentious Issue 
in Massachusetts, ARAB AM. INST. (July 5, 2012, 10:13 AM), http://goo.gl/XMDzQD 
(describing Senator Scott Brown’s accusation that candidate Elizabeth Warren wants “to 
make illegal immigration more attractive”); Tim Eaton, Immigration in Spotlight in State 
House Race, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, http://goo.gl/LT02lY (updated Apr. 24, 2012, 5:22 
AM) (“Water and transportation might be the most serious issues facing voters in western 
Travis County, but the challenger in the race for District 47 in the Texas House is 
hammering away on the more controversial topic of illegal immigration in an effort to oust 
the district’s one-term incumbent.”); Jessica Lipscomb, Sheriff’s Candidates: Illegal 
Immigration a ‘Major Issue’ in 2012, NAPLES NEWS (July 27, 2012, 5:51 PM), 
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issue, tapping into wells of strongly held beliefs and feelings about the 
identity of our nation, our way of life, our families, our economic and social 
future, and, increasingly, the rule of law. 
This last point is crucial to understanding the current dynamics.  While 
immigration has traditionally been understood as a complex phenomenon 
resulting from a web of powerful “push” and “pull” factors—such as 
economics, family, political upheaval, and educational opportunities153—it 
has increasingly come to be seen in the United States through the lens of 
legality and law enforcement.  Since the late 1980s, federal immigration 
law has become more focused on the (real and perceived) overlap between 
immigration and criminal law, leading to the “criminalization” of 
immigration law and procedures.154  Since 2001, immigration violations are 
increasingly considered and, in many cases, prosecuted as criminal 
violations155 or violations that, at a minimum, indicate the perpetrator’s 
general lawlessness.  This last attitude is well-expressed in the statement of 
purpose in Alabama’s restrictive state immigration law, commonly known 
 
http://goo.gl/txjcLA (describing four Collier County, Florida candidates for Sheriff, 
campaigning largely on the issue of immigration enforcement)  
153 See, e.g., Cecelia M. Espenoza, The Illusory Provisions of Sanctions: The 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 343, 345–46 (1994) 
(discussing the attempt in IRCA to address the underlying causes of migration); James F. 
Hollifield et al., Immigrants, Markets, and Rights: The United States as an Emerging 
Migration State, 27 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 7, 10, 38 (2008) (exploring the interplay of 
economic, sociological, and public policy factors in migration). 
154 See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some 
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1890–91 (2000); 
Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of 
Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 471 (2007); Peter L. Markowitz, 
Straddling The Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of 
Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 316–20 (2008); Robert 
Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the Constitution’s 
Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 305–07 (2000); Juliet P. 
Stumpf, Penalizing Immigrants, 18 FED. SENT’G REP. 264, 264 (2006); Allison S. Hartry, 
Comment, Gendering Crimmigration: The Intersection of Gender, Immigration, and the 
Criminal Justice System, 27 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 1, 7–14 (2012).  See generally 
Victor C. Romero, Decriminalizing Border Crossings, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 273, 274–76 
(2010) (arguing for the decriminalization of border crossings in order to address concerns of 
racial profiling and the increasing stigmatization of undocumented persons). 
155 Illegal Entry Becomes Top Criminal Charge, TRAC IMMIGRATION (June 10, 2011), 
http://goo.gl/YDaoGV.  In June 2011, illegal reentry (under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012)) became 
the most frequent criminal charge filed in U.S. federal courts, accounting for 23% of all 
federal criminal prosecutions, just surpassing prosecutions for illegal entry (under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1325), the second most frequent charge.  Between 2006 and 2011, the likelihood of being 
criminally prosecuted following an apprehension by Customs and Border Protection 
increased from 2% to 20%.  Decline in Federal Criminal Immigration Prosecutions, TRAC 
IMMIGRATION, at tbl.1 (June 12, 2012), http://goo.gl/c3XUkL. 
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as H.B. 56.  It begins, “The State of Alabama finds that illegal immigration 
is causing economic hardship and lawlessness in this state . . . .”156  Former 
Arizona State Senator Russell Pearce, a proponent of strict immigration 
enforcement and the author of Arizona’s S.B. 1070, takes the position that 
the lawlessness of an individual who has no legal immigration status is 
fundamentally at odds with what it means to be an American: “Being an 
American is a responsibility, and it comes through respecting and upholding 
the Constitution, the law of our land which says what you must do to be a 
citizen of this country.  Freedom is not free.”157  This mindset is likewise 
reflected at the highest levels of our legal system, most recently in Justice 
Samuel Alito’s concurring opinion in the Arizona case, in which the Justice 
artfully conflates the administrative question of immigration status with the 
criminal offense of entering the country without inspection.158 
The political exploitation of this swirling stew of emotional flashpoints 
and the increasingly common view of immigration as a law-and-order 
question have combined to create an atmosphere in which there is a high 
level of hostility to foreigners and a strong impulse in many quarters to 
expel immigration violators.  At the same time, there is a widely held 
perception that the federal government has failed in its job of expelling 
these violators.  State and local lawmakers and other elected officials have 
been motivated to step into that breach, proposing many ranging solutions 
and making immigration a lively local political issue.159 
 
156 H.B. 56, § 2, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess., 2011 Ala. Acts 535. 
157 Pearce, supra note 67, at 246. 
158 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2528 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).  S.B. 
1070 § 2(B) specifically charges officers with “determin[ing] the immigration status” of 
certain lawfully stopped persons.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2012).  Rather than 
framing his discussion of this provision with a hypothetical in which that administrative 
status was at issue, however, Justice Alito posed the hypothetical of an officer who was 
pursuing reasonable suspicion that a driver entered the country illegally, “which is a federal 
crime.”  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2528.  The Justice then went on to discuss the authority of 
state and local officers to “make stops and arrests for violations of federal criminal laws,” 
not their authority (or lack thereof) to enforce issues of status.  Id.  It is unlikely that Justice 
Alito conflated these issues unwittingly, given the pains Justice Kennedy took in the 
majority opinion to state clearly that “[r]emoval is a civil, not criminal, matter,” id. at 2499 
(majority opinion), and “[a]s a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain 
present in the United States,” id. at 2505.  For a similar conflation of administrative violation 
with criminal offense, see INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1047 (1984).  The Pew 
Hispanic Center estimated in 2006 that as many as 45% of those without lawful immigration 
status had entered the country legally and then overstayed their visas.  Modes of Entry for the 
Unauthorized Migrant Population, PEW HISPANIC CTR. (May 22, 2006), 
http://goo.gl/Gsy1v9. 
159 See discussion supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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The dangers of this heated political rhetoric are particularly acute in 
local jurisdictions where sheriffs, police chiefs, states’ attorneys, and other 
law enforcement policymakers are likely to hold elected, political positions.  
These elected officials are directly accountable to the voting majority.  They 
are therefore both sensitive and vulnerable to immigration’s highly charged 
politics. 
3. Law Enforcement Involvement in “Attrition Through Enforcement” 
In such a charged political atmosphere, local and state law officers 
have often been conscripted into assisting “attrition through enforcement” 
or “voluntary deportation” through state immigration laws.  Law 
enforcement involvement in this project exacerbates both racial and 
political dynamics in immigrant communities’ relationship with law 
enforcement. 
The phrase “attrition through enforcement” was coined by Kris 
Kobach,160 the principal author of both Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and Alabama’s 
H.B. 56.161  Arizona’s law explicitly states: 
The legislature declares that the intent of this act is to make attrition through 
enforcement the public policy of all state and local government agencies in Arizona.  
The provisions of this act are intended to work together to discourage and deter the 
unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons unlawfully 
present in the United States.162 
Kobach’s statement of the theory behind this approach is that 
“ratcheting up” enforcement and simultaneously restricting access to the 
benefits of life in the United States (principally, employment) can convince 
unauthorized immigrants to leave voluntarily and remain outside the 
country.163  The concept subsequently has been embellished in political 
rhetoric and actualized in proposed and enacted state laws in a variety of 
ways.  These state laws restrict everything from employment,164 to 
 
160 See generally Kris W. Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach 
to Illegal Immigration, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 155 (2008). 
161 See Suzy Khimm, Nativist Son: The Legal Mastermind Behind the Wave of Anti-
Immigration Laws Sweeping the Country, MOTHER JONES, Mar./Apr. 2012, at 31 (“Kobach 
helped Arizona lawmakers craft the infamous immigration law [S.B. 1070] that passed in the 
spring of 2010.  He’s coached legislators across the country in their efforts to pass dozens of 
similar measures, ranging from Alabama, Georgia, and Missouri to the small town of 
Fremont, Nebraska . . . .”); see also Editorial, It’s What They Asked For, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
20, 2011, at A28. 
162 S.B. 1070, § 1, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 113 (emphasis added).  The Court in Arizona 
cites this bill.  See 132 S. Ct. at 2497. 
163 Kobach, supra note 160, at 156. 
164 S.B. 1070, § 7 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212 (2012)). 
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housing,165 transportation,166 public education,167 and utility and water 
contracts.168  Statements surrounding these laws’ proposal and passage 
demonstrate lawmakers’ purposes: to deny unlawfully present immigrants 
enough basic necessities and make their lives so unlivable that they will 
leave the jurisdiction and to deter others from entering. 
A key component in each of these laws is also explicit state and local 
police involvement in ratcheting up immigration enforcement.  Arizona’s 
law, famously, was designed to enlist the state’s officers in immigration 
enforcement.  It requires officers to investigate the immigration status of 
any lawfully stopped individual (if the officer developed reasonable 
suspicion that the individual was in the United States illegally) and, 
separately, authorizes state and local officers to make warrantless arrests of 
those believed to have committed public offenses that would make them 
deportable.169  Other states’ provisions are similar.170 
The use of law enforcement to ratchet up pressure on unauthorized 
immigrants is particularly troubling in a context where the group targeted 
for enforcement overlaps so significantly with a much larger racial group 
that includes citizens, permanent residents, and other individuals authorized 
to live in the country.  This targeted enforcement jeopardizes the sense of 
belonging and trust in authorities that both the targeted group and the 
members of the much larger racial minority feel.171  Many Latinos with 
 
165 H.B. 56, § 13(a)(4), 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess., 2011 Ala. Acts 535. 
166 S.B. 1070, § 10 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-3511). 
167 H.B. 56, § 28. 
168 Id. § 27. 
169 S.B. 1070, §§ 2(B), 6 (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051, § 13-3883). 
170 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-13-18 (2011) (requiring local law enforcement to verify 
legal immigration status of any person charged with a crime for which bail is required); 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-29-103 (West 2013) (requiring that local officers who have 
probable cause to suspect that an arrestee is an undocumented immigrant report the 
individual to ICE); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-1-1 (West 2011) (authorizing warrantless arrests 
by officers with probable cause to believe an individual is under a removal order by an 
immigration court); GA. CODE ANN. § 35-1-17(b)(2) (West 2012) (authorizing memoranda of 
understanding (MOUs) between state and local law enforcement and ICE; granting any 
officer operating under such an agreement “the power to arrest, with probable cause, any 
person suspected of being an illegal alien”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-1003 (West 2011) 
(authorizing officers to verify immigration status of arrestees); UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-5-
22.7(2) (West 2009) (inviting officers from ICE and state and local law enforcement 
personnel to participate in a “mutually supportive, multi-agency strike force to more 
effectively utilize their combined skills, expertise, and resources” toward combatting major 
crimes associated with illegal immigration); see also Anti-Illegal Immigration Laws in 
States, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2012, http://goo.gl/lJ48ZU. 
171 See, e.g., Yolanda Vázquez, Perpetuating the Marginalization of Latinos: A 
Collateral Consequence of the Incorporation of Immigration Law into the Criminal Justice 
System, 54 HOW. L.J. 639, 673 (2011); Guadalupe Vidales et al., Police and Immigration 
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legal status have felt targeted by laws designed to pressure the 
undocumented.172  Others may fear for the security of noncitizen family 
members or friends.173  This in turn prejudices the willingness of group 
members—regardless of status—to cooperate with law enforcement, which 
then inhibits officers’ ability to do their jobs, enforce the law, and protect 
their communities.174 
 
Enforcement: Impacts on Latino(a) Residents’ Perceptions of Police, 32 POLICING: INT’L J. 
POLICE STRAT. & MGMT. 631, 632, 647–48 (2009). 
172 See, e.g., Juan Carlos Lopez, Looking Beyond the Debate on Immigration, PEW 
RESEARCH CTR. (June 7, 2012), http://goo.gl/U6qfZq (reporting that many Latinos believe state 
anti-immigration laws to be aimed at Latinos in general, regardless of immigration status). 
173 See JOANNA DREBY, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, HOW TODAY’S IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT POLICIES IMPACT CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES: A VIEW FROM THE 
GROUND 2–3 (August 2012), available at http://goo.gl/79aMMi (discussing the effects on 
children of the fear that their parents will be deported); SETH FREED WESSLER, APPLIED 
RESEARCH CTR., SHATTERED FAMILIES: THE PERILOUS INTERSECTION OF IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT AND THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 27–28 (November 2011), available at 
http://goo.gl/nP6Aiy (reporting that children in foster care in counties with 287(g) 
agreements are significantly more likely to have a detained or deported parent). 
174 See, e.g., Radha Vishnuvajjala, Insecure Communities: How an Immigration 
Enforcement Program Encourages Battered Women to Stay Silent, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 
185, 202–04 (2012) (noting that immigrants in cities adopting Secure Communities are less 
likely to report domestic violence and other crimes); see also DEBRA A. HOFFMASTER ET AL., 
POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH F., POLICE AND IMMIGRATION: HOW CHIEFS ARE LEADING THEIR 
COMMUNITIES THROUGH THE CHALLENGES 22 (2010) (discussing how police are less able to 
establish trust and cooperation with immigrants when police are tasked with enforcing 
immigration laws; immigrants feared they would be disproportionately targeted by police 
and charged with minor crimes as a pretext for investigating immigration status); id. at 40 
(discussing an officer who had been working in a community with a high immigrant 
population and “spent the first six months of the assignment . . . assuring members of the 
immigrant community that the Police Department was not interested in deporting them,” and 
finding that relationships between community and police were characterized by “suspicion 
and mistrust”).  See generally David S. Kirk et al., The Paradox of Law Enforcement in 
Immigrant Communities: Does Tough Immigration Enforcement Undermine Public Safety?, 
641 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 79 (2012), available at http://goo.gl/1t41eV 
(arguing that recent trends toward strict local enforcement of immigration laws may actually 
undercut public safety by creating a cynicism of the law in immigrant communities); Victor 
Manuel Ramos, LI Leads State in Undocumented-Immigrant Deportations, NEWSDAY, Sept. 
2, 2012, available at http://goo.gl/F76u7h (describing tension between immigrants and 
police following Long Island’s adoption of Secure Communities); Chris Strunk & Helga 
Leitner, Redefining Secure Communities, THE NATION (Dec. 21, 2011), http://goo.gl/2RHyvu 
(citing sharp drops in registration for ESL classes and increasing instances in which accident 
victims declined to wait for police after the adoption of Secure Communities in northern 
Virginia).  These data are supported anecdotally as well.  A public defender recounted how a 
client called the police when he was assaulted, only to be arrested and charged himself when 
he showed an international driver’s license as ID.  In the words of the public defender, “Will 
any immigrant who knows someone subjected to this kind of treatment ever call the police to 
report a crime?”  E-mail from Robert Morris, Pub. Defender, to Maureen Sweeney (Jan. 16, 
2013, 9:15 PM) (on file with author and the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology). 
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Where a group perceives that it is the target of police harassment 
through immigration enforcement, it becomes irrelevant whether the law or 
program facilitating that participation is technically authorized at the state 
or federal level.  The simple participation of officers in immigration 
enforcement confirms the community’s perception that the police are 
seeking to remove its members.175  In fact, state and federal programs often 
overlap, and the motivations and perceptions of one bleed into the other.  
The first substantive section of Alabama’s H.B. 56 provides an example, 
requiring the state to make efforts to enter into a 287(g) agreement with 
DHS so that its officers can directly enforce federal immigration law.176  
Another is in Maricopa County, where DOJ found that the sheriff 
department’s general discriminatory practices blended seamlessly with its 
discriminatory misuse of the federal 287(g) program.177 
Beyond these practical objections, though, the more profound 
problems with the policy of “attrition by enforcement” lie in the mechanism 
by which the policy is designed to work—that is, the hyper-enforcement of 
criminal law to ratchet up pressure on one segment of the population to 
deter completely unrelated and noncriminal violations by a different group 
of potential future entrants.  The primary purpose of the policies as enacted 
in various state laws is not to deter crime or even to assist the federal 
government in remedying current violations of immigration law, but “to 
discourage illegal immigration” prospectively by creating enforcement 
climates that are hostile enough to dissuade potential future entrants.178  In 
other words, the policies misdirect the considerable police power of states 
against a defined segment of the population for purposes completely 
unrelated to criminal enforcement. 
 
175 See CHUCK WEXLER ET AL., HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL, TASK FORCE ON 
SECURE COMMUNITIES: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 24 (2011), available at 
http://goo.gl/yQ0OSA (“When communities perceive that police are enforcing federal 
immigration laws, especially if there is a perception that such enforcement is targeting minor 
offenders, that trust is broken in some communities, and victims, witnesses and other 
residents may become fearful of reporting crime or approaching the police to exchange 
information.”). 
176 H.B. 56 § 4(a), 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess., 2011 Ala. Acts 535. 
177 On December 15, 2011, DOJ released letters showing its findings of racial profiling 
in those counties and DHS simultaneously revoked the counties’ 287(g) authority.  See 
Napolitano Press Release, supra note 30. 
178 Though proponents may argue that the law enforcement provisions are designed to 
assist in remedying past or current violations, the language of the laws themselves belies that 
explanation.  Alabama’s law, for example, declares in its statement of purpose: “Therefore, 
the people of the State of Alabama declare that it is a compelling public interest to 
discourage illegal immigration by requiring all agencies within this state to fully cooperate 
with federal immigration authorities in the enforcement of federal immigration laws.”  H.B. 
56, § 2 (emphasis added). 
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Enlisting law enforcement officers into the project of making life 
untenable for any segment of society is deeply troubling on many levels.  
The moral authority of the law derives from the ideal of its dispassionate 
and evenhanded application to all, and explicitly joining police powers with 
what essentially becomes a campaign of harassment offends the deepest 
notions of the fair use of governmental authority.  It strips the law and law 
enforcement of their moral force and brings into direct question the 
constitutional promise of equal protection under the law.  This is 
particularly the case where, as here, the boundaries of the targeted group 
overlap to a significant degree with identifiable racial minorities and the 
distinction between the two groups—lawful immigration status—is 
invisible to an observer.  It is also particularly the case where, as here, the 
target group is the subject of hotly contested political debate.  For these 
reasons alone, law enforcement officers’ involvement in any state-
sponsored attempts to deter or discourage future immigration are extremely 
worrisome. 
B. INEFFECTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS WITH SHADOW 
ENFORCEMENT 
We have seen that a constellation of factors gives reason for special 
concern about abuses in the context of state and local officers’ shadow 
immigration enforcement.  This Part demonstrates how the usual safeguards 
against those abuses are ineffective in this context. 
1. No Effective Remedy in the Exclusionary Rule 
a. Insufficient Deterrent in the Criminal Exclusionary Rule 
Although the primary job of state and local law enforcement officers is 
to enforce criminal law, the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings is 
insufficient to deter police abuse in the context of shadow immigration 
enforcement.  If an officer engages in pretextual enforcement of criminal or 
traffic laws with the true intent of acquiring an opportunity to investigate an 
individual’s immigration status, the officer will not be concerned about the 
admissibility of evidence in a criminal court.  The criminal exclusionary 
rule will not therefore serve as any kind of deterrent, because prosecution 
was not the goal of the stop. 
Furthermore, these types of pretextual stops generally involve traffic 
or other minor violations.179  Officers may forgo issuing or pursuing a 
criminal citation or charge altogether in favor of referring the individual to 
 
179 Thirty-seven percent of Secure Communities arrests in fiscal year 2012 resulted from 
traffic violations.  GAO-12-708, supra note 56, at 23. 
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ICE.180  Even when criminal or traffic charges are lodged, they are often not 
defended as vigorously as more serious charges would be.  Only the 
extremely rare defendant will go to the trouble and expense of filing a 
motion to suppress for a nonjailable offense in traffic court.  Fourth 
Amendment challenges on these charges thus provide little credible threat 
to officers, and the threat of excluding evidence is without appreciable 
deterrent value. 
Finally, the simple fact of the matter is that the law of the land allows 
pretextual traffic stops as long as the officer had reasonable suspicion.  
Even if the officer stopped a driver because she was Latina and the officer 
hoped for an immigration arrest, if the driver had indeed failed to properly 
use her turn signal, the stop would withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny 
and there would be no threat of exclusion in the adjudication of the traffic 
charge.181 
b. No Regular Exclusionary Rule in Immigration Removal Proceedings 
In 1984, the Supreme Court considered whether to allow the 
exclusionary rule to deter immigration enforcement abuses in INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza.182  The Court decided at that time that the exclusionary rule was 
unnecessary in immigration proceedings, in large part because immigration 
enforcement was conducted by one agency, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS).  The Court determined that the agency had a 
“comprehensive scheme” for avoiding and punishing Fourth Amendment 
violations by its officers.183  In particular, the Court relied on INS’s strong, 
central set of regulations addressing Fourth Amendment concerns in stops, 
detentions, and arrests; its extensive officer training on Fourth Amendment 
law in the immigration context; and its procedures for internally 
investigating and punishing abuses.184  This combination of clear rules, 
training, and oversight was considered essential by the Court to guard 
against and deter Fourth Amendment abuses. 
Following Lopez-Mendoza, the exclusionary rule is generally 
inapplicable in removal proceedings, except where a respondent can show 
that the underlying Fourth Amendment violation was egregious or violated 
notions of fundamental fairness.185  A “garden-variety” constitutional 
 
180 Between October 2009 and September 2010, 28% of those removed through the 
Secure Communities program were “noncriminals.”  WASLIN, supra note 40, at 9. 
181 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
182 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). 
183 Id. at 1044. 
184 Id. at 1044–45. 
185 Id. at 1050–51; see also, e.g., Oliva-Ramos v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 
2012) (“[W]e reiterate today that the exclusionary rule may apply in removal proceedings 
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violation is insufficient to justify suppression in immigration 
proceedings.186  Despite a chorus of calls to reconsider Lopez-Mendoza,187 
the exclusionary rule applies in immigration proceedings only when a 
respondent can meet the very high burden of proving an egregious Fourth 
Amendment violation.  For this reason, very few motions to suppress are 
granted in immigration courts, and relatively few motions are even filed.  
This weak threat of a motion to suppress in removal proceedings therefore 
does not serve as an effective deterrent to race-based enforcement or other 
Fourth Amendment violations in immigration enforcement. 
2. No Controlling Regulation, Training, or Oversight for Shadow 
Enforcement 
As we have seen, shadow immigration enforcement occurs outside the 
core enforcement mandate of state and local officers.  Immigration 
activities influence their primary duties “under the table” and go officially 
unacknowledged.  As a result, officers generally have no direct training, 
regulation, or oversight of immigration-related activities, either from state 
or federal supervisors, despite the important ways in which immigration 
affects the conduct of their primary duties. 
 
where an alien shows egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might 
transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the 
evidence obtained.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Maria de Lourdes Lucero-
Gomez, No. A95 180 216, 2006 WL 2008328, at *1 (B.I.A. June 1, 2006) (“The Supreme 
Court indicated in its decision, however, that the exclusionary rule may apply if there are 
egregious Fourth Amendment violations which transgress notions of fundamental 
fairness . . . .”).  Lopez-Mendoza also left open the possible application of the exclusionary 
rule in immigration proceedings if there was reason to believe that Fourth Amendment 
violations were “widespread.”  468 U.S. at 1050. 
186 See, e.g., Garcia-Torres v. Holder, 660 F.3d 333, 336–37 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Petitioner 
points to nothing more than a warrantless entry of business premises and arrest, mere 
garden-variety error, if a Fourth Amendment violation at all. . . .  [E]ven assuming that the 
search and seizure here constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment, any such violation 
is not ‘egregious.’”). 
187 See Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the 
Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1624–27 (2010); 
Iguina, supra note 29, at 209–10 (concluding that a “reexamination of the Lopez-Mendoza 
doctrine is required”).  See generally Irene Scharf, The Exclusionary Rule in Immigration 
Proceedings: Where It Was, Where It Is, Where It May be Going, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
53 (2010); Nathan Treadwell, Fugitive Operations and the Fourth Amendment: Representing 
Immigrants Arrested in Warrantless Home Raids, 89 N.C. L. REV. 507 (2011); Stella Burch 
Elias, Comment, “Good Reason to Believe”: Widespread Constitutional Violations in the 
Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. 
L. REV. 1109; Matthew S. Mulqueen, Note, Rethinking the Role of the Exclusionary Rule in 
Removal Proceedings, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1157 (2008). 
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a. No Controlling Regulation 
No central set of regulations instructs state and local officers on the 
limitations of their powers when they engage in shadow immigration 
enforcement.  In contrast, when the Lopez-Mendoza Court found that the 
INS adequately addressed Fourth Amendment concerns, it relied on a 
detailed set of regulations that clearly and specifically mirrored INS 
officers’ obligations with regard to the Fourth Amendment in the context of 
immigration enforcement.188  These regulations continue to serve at least 
two purposes for officers that come within their ambit.  Most directly, the 
regulations help to shape agency policy and practice.  They are the rules by 
which the officers are trained to operate.  In addition, they are indirectly 
enforceable by the individuals they are designed to protect.  Courts have 
terminated immigration proceedings where these regulations, promulgated 
for the benefit of arrestees, have been violated in ways that compromise due 
process or prejudice the arrestee in ways that potentially affect the outcome 
of the proceedings.189  Both of these regulatory purposes increase the degree 
to which Fourth Amendment rights are likely to be protected.  Of course, 
neither of these purposes applies to state and local officers who engage in 
immigration enforcement activities, as the regulations do not bind them. 
Where state and local law enforcement officers get involved in shadow 
immigration enforcement, considerable confusion often arises about what 
constitutional, statutory, regulatory, and administrative standards apply.  
This is particularly the case where a state or local officer uses traffic or 
other state law enforcement as a pretext to engage in immigration 
enforcement or where the officer acts without even a thin veil of that 
pretext. 
Let us consider again the state trooper who arrested the Maryland man 
for purposes of conducting an “immigration investigation” when the man 
came to retrieve his car.190  The officer, apparently aware that he had no 
federal or state authority to conduct such an investigation, testified that he 
did not need probable cause to handcuff and bring the man into the police 
station because he was merely “detaining him” for federal authorities.  
Surely, the fact that an officer acts outside his legal authority does not 
 
188 See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 287.8 (2012) (addressing, inter alia, proper use of force by 
immigration agents (§ 287.8(a)); the need for reasonable suspicion that an individual is 
unlawfully in the United States to detain for questioning (§ 287.8(b)); and the need for 
probable cause for an arrest and standards for the issuance of warrants (§ 287.8(c))). 
189 See Matter of Garcia-Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 325, 1980 WL 121881 (B.I.A. 1980); 
see also United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954). United 
States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1979).  For an explanation of the law 
on motions to terminate for regulatory violations, see Iguina, supra note 29, at 230–35. 
190 See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text. 
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exempt the officer from constitutional or other restrictions on his actions.  
Just as surely, the confusion over arrest authority and standards for lawful 
arrest is genuine and considerable.  What rules apply to a state or local 
officer making an arrest for a federal administrative immigration violation?  
In assessing whether that officer has reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause, should he apply state criminal standards (in which he has been 
trained) or federal immigration enforcement standards (which differ in 
some significant ways and in which he has likely not been trained)?191  
What authority do state and local officers have to enforce federal civil or 
criminal immigration law,192 and what constitutes an arrestee’s admission to 
an immigration crime as opposed to an administrative violation?  The 
absence of clear directives in this area opens the door for officers to apply 
their own “commonsense” standards and promises continued confusion, 
lack of clarity, and abuse. 
b. No Standardized Training or Oversight 
Just as no central regulations govern state and local enforcement of 
federal immigration law, no standardized training curriculum for, or 
oversight of, state and local officers exists regarding immigration 
enforcement or the proper sharing of immigration status information with 
federal authorities.  Most departments likely provide no training on these 
aspects of the job; the peripheral nature of officers’ involvement in 
immigration enforcement virtually ensures that departments’ training and 
oversight will not focus specifically on immigration activities, even when 
shadow immigration enforcement creates particular constitutional dangers.  
The fact that law enforcement officials are elected in many jurisdictions 
where immigrants have little political voice further means that those 
officials have few political incentives to invest resources in vigorously 
protecting immigrants’ civil liberties.193 
 
191 See supra Part II.B.  
192 Although this question has now been answered by the Supreme Court in Arizona, 
confusion in the field will likely continue on this point.  See, e.g., Martinez-Medina v. 
Holder, 673. F.3d 1029, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that a reasonable officer could 
be confused under then-existing case law about whether an arrestee’s admission of unlawful 
presence was the admission of a crime, which would give the officer authority to arrest, or 
the admission of a federal administrative offense, which would not). 
193 In contrast, where immigrant communities are well-established and organized, some 
local officials have vigorously defended immigrants’ civil rights.  See, e.g., Cristina Parker, 
El Paso City Council Passes Immigration Resolution, BORDER NETWORK FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS (Feb. 5, 2013), http://goo.gl/3aJ5Xe (describing a unanimous resolution by the El 
Paso City Council advocating for immigrants’ rights and “an end to enforcement against 
[their] border community”); Fernando Perez, Santa Clara County Ends Collaboration with 
ICE, NEW AM. MEDIA (Oct. 18, 2011), http://goo.gl/SZal98 (describing a unanimous vote by 
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Unfortunately, the Maricopa and Alamance County sheriff’s offices 
again provide examples of what can happen in a local office when officers 
have inadequate training or politically compromised oversight on suspects’ 
constitutional protections.  Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio has made 
no secret of his strong political views about immigrants, and DOJ found 
that he had created “a general culture of bias” in the office and encouraged 
broadly discriminatory policing targeted against Latinos.  Significantly, 
DOJ’s investigation concluded, among its many findings, that specific 
failures in training and oversight allowed for and exacerbated this 
discriminatory culture: 
[Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office] fosters and perpetuates discriminatory police and 
jail practices by failing to operate in accordance with basic policing and correctional 
practices and by failing to develop and implement policing and correctional 
safeguards against discrimination in such areas as training, supervision, and 
accountability systems.194 
The investigation likewise found that the office retaliated directly against 
individuals who complained about or criticized its practices.195  Testimony 
in a racial profiling lawsuit brought by private plaintiffs against the county 
and its sheriff’s office additionally focused on deputy training and 
oversight.196 
The interaction of these elements is, of course, not unique to that 
county but rather demonstrates dynamics that play out in perhaps less 
dramatic fashion in various programs and in departments all over the 
country.  DHS’s own Homeland Security Advisory Council’s Task Force 
on Secure Communities found in September 2011 that the program’s 
integrity suffered because state and local jurisdictions were not sufficiently 
accountable for civil rights abuses connected with Secure Communities.197  
The Task Force recommended reforms to the complaint process, active ICE 
monitoring for improper policing connected with Secure Communities, and 
the establishment of a pilot multidisciplinary panel to review complaints.198  
In response, ICE has developed additional training materials and has 
 
the Santa Clara Board of County Supervisors to cease cooperation with ICE through Secure 
Communities); Press Release, City of Chicago, Mayor Emanuel Introduces Welcoming City 
Ordinance (July 10, 2012), available at http://goo.gl/Dq6wzJ (announcing an ordinance 
designed to support and protect the city’s immigrant communities). 
194 DOJ Letter to Maricopa County, supra note 95, at 4. 
195 Id. 
196 J.J. Hensley, Racial-Profiling Trial: Former MCSO Deputy Testifies, ARIZ. REPUBLIC 
(Aug. 1, 2012, 10:01 PM), http://goo.gl/M6llev (discussing Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio, 598 
F. Supp. 2d 1025 (D. Ariz. 2010)). 
197 WEXLER, supra note 175, at 25. 
198 Id. at 26–27. 
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publicized its complaint procedure,199 but it has been unable to compel state 
and local law enforcement to use those training materials or cooperate in 
investigations of abuse.  In its July 2012 report on Secure Communities, 
GAO continued to identify as a problem for civil rights protections the lack 
of accountability of state and local jurisdictions.200 
DOJ’s Alamance County investigation similarly found a culture of 
bias that began with the sheriff and permeated the department.  Specifically, 
it found that poor reporting of its activities made oversight of the 
department difficult by masking racial profiling and other discriminatory 
practices.201 
3. Impractical or Ineffective Alternative Legal Actions to Enforce the 
Fourth Amendment 
One reason the Supreme Court found the exclusionary rule to be 
unnecessary in the immigration context was because alternative remedies 
were available to enforce Fourth Amendment rights.  The Court found that 
because the INS was a single agency under central control and involved in 
operations of a highly repetitive character, legal actions for declaratory 
relief represented effective means to challenge abusive institutional 
practices.202  This, of course, is not true of the myriad state and local 
agencies whose officers participate in shadow enforcement.  For example, 
the fact that a group of private plaintiffs and DOJ have both sued Maricopa 
County for declaratory relief on constitutional violations will not protect the 
residents of Frederick County, Maryland, or even neighboring Yavapai 
County in Arizona, regardless of the litigation’s outcome.  Whereas 
widespread abuses are committed by many far-flung and diverse actors, the 
effect of declaratory relief is localized or indirect at best. 
Furthermore, bringing an equal protection or Fourth Amendment 
challenge in federal court takes legal resources, sophistication, and time that 
most victims of these abuses simply do not have.  DOJ and the private 
plaintiffs in the Maricopa County lawsuits spent years amassing eyewitness 
testimony, obtaining and reviewing arrest statistics, and preparing statistical 
analyses to support their claims.203  DOJ’s investigation of Alamance 
 
199 ICE OFFICE OF DIR., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE RESPONSE TO THE TASK FORCE ON 
SECURE COMMUNITIES FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 8 (2012), available at 
http://goo.gl/QBlX6M. 
200 GAO-12-708, supra note 42, at 42.  
201 DOJ Letter to Alamance County, supra note 5, at 3. 
202 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1045 (1984). 
203 Alan Gomez, Racial Profiling Difficult to Prove, Experts Say, USA TODAY (July 11, 
2012, 7:04 PM), http://goo.gl/53yXt5 (noting that nearly four years elapsed between the time 
DOJ initiated a review of Maricopa County and decided it had enough evidence to sue); J.J. 
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County lasted for over two years.204  These resource and time limitations are 
exacerbated, of course, for individuals defending themselves in immigration 
removal proceedings. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS IN RESPONSE TO SHADOW 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 
Shadow immigration enforcement creates heightened constitutional 
tensions because of the special risk that the rights of members of immigrant 
communities will be violated and because the usual safeguards are 
ineffective in protecting them.  Statistical reviews of Secure Communities 
and 287(g) have revealed that these programs result in skewed arrest 
numbers, indicating overzealous enforcement against individuals who are 
easily targeted because of their race.205  These numbers, in turn, support 
advocates’ and community members’ insistence that these programs 
encourage, or at least permit, officers to target Latinos and that such race-
based enforcement is commonplace.  DOJ’s in-depth investigations in two 
especially problematic jurisdictions show in graphic detail how these 
programs play into race-based enforcement dynamics.206  Investigation of 
TSA officers in Boston and Newark further confirm the dangers inherent in 
an enforcement context where meaningful protections against and remedies 
for Fourth Amendment violations are absent.207  Having recognized these 
constitutional pressure points, it is crucial that we take a step back and 
evaluate what constitutional safeguards, if any, will protect the 
constitutional rights of both immigrants and their wider communities. 
A. RECONSIDERING THE STRATEGY OF FEDERAL–STATE 
COOPERATION 
Given the fundamental lack of accountability and the negative 
constitutional incentives created by state and local officers’ participation in 
shadow immigration enforcement, the federal government should, at a 
minimum, rethink its promotion of programs that facilitate shadow 
enforcement.  A clear-eyed look at the dynamics created by state and local 
officers’ shadow immigration enforcement may show that the constitutional 
problems are fundamental and cannot be remedied with programmatic 
tinkering.  Racial targeting complaints have arisen in the full range of 
 
Hensley, Racial-Profiling Trial Outcome Hinges on Hard Data, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 4, 
2012, available at http://goo.gl/JJ2eoj (highlighting the role of the litigants’ dueling experts). 
204 DOJ Letter to Alamance County, supra note 5, at 1. 
205 See supra notes 98–112 and accompanying text. 
206 See supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text. 
207 See supra notes 9–13 and accompanying text. 
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programs that involve state and local officers in immigration reporting.  The 
important facilitating role that these programs play in that targeting has 
been revealed by everything from broad statistical analyses of the programs, 
to details of how they have been exploited, to their particularly devastating 
effects in poorly led enforcement agencies.  While DHS has insisted that 
these programs target the most dangerous criminals for deportation, we 
have seen that the government has been content to use them to identify and 
deport large numbers of individuals who have no serious criminal 
background or criminal charges whatsoever. This willingness has 
encouraged, or at least resulted in, race-based arrests by officers who have 
little or no training in immigration-related constitutional law and who know 
that they can get credit for immigration referrals with virtually no 
accountability for abusive tactics.  Given the context, it might be surprising 
if these incentives did not result in officers improperly targeting those 
presumed to be “foreign” because of their race. 
The Obama Administration has attempted to adjust these programs to 
address civil liberties concerns, creating a Secure Communities Task Force 
and revisiting 287(g) guidance in some cases.  However, these attempts 
have not—and cannot—eliminate the fundamental program dynamics.  In 
essence, these programs create incentives for officers to make arrests, while 
erecting a kind of shell game of shifting authority that protects them from 
constitutional accountability.  Because this dynamic goes to the heart of 
how programs like 287(g) and Secure Communities operate, eliminating the 
incentives without ending or seriously rethinking and restructuring the 
programs will likely prove impossible.  DHS’s own Secure Communities 
Task Force, created to address community members’ concerns (including 
racial profiling and damage to community policing), deadlocked on whether 
to suspend or terminate the program; approximately half of its members 
favored suspension or termination, and half believed the program could 
continue with some adjustments.208  The Obama Administration has also 
announced its intention to stop promoting street-level enforcement through 
the 287(g) program for jurisdictions not already participating. 
As we have seen, DOJ has likewise prioritized investigation of and 
enforcement against local jurisdictions where it has found evidence that 
they improperly targeted those perceived to be immigrants because of their 
race.  Its actions, however, have been directed toward individual 
problematic jurisdictions and have so far stopped short of fully facing up to 
the dynamics of federal–state cooperation programs that both incentivize 
and mask racial profiling in local jurisdictions.  The pervasiveness and the 
difficulty in remedying or preventing problems in these programs require 
 
208 See WEXLER ET AL., supra note 197, at 27. 
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the federal government to undertake a deep and searching reconsideration 
of these programs’ overall desirability. 
B. FULLY ENFORCING THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN IMMIGRATION 
COURTS 
1. Supreme Court Reconsideration of the Exclusionary Rule in Immigration 
Proceedings 
The constitutional tensions created by shadow immigration 
enforcement are different in detail, dynamic, and effect from those the 
Supreme Court considered in 1984 when it declined in INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza to apply the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings.  These 
dynamics create their own incentives for officers and open the door to racial 
profiling and other abuses in the vacuum of effective remedies.  A large 
number of immigration removal proceedings are now the product of state 
and local participation in shadow enforcement programs—the Criminal 
Alien Program, Secure Communities, National Crime Information Center 
checks, 287(g), joint enforcement operations, and state law initiatives.  The 
numbers resulting from these programs, together with the incentives and 
lack of accountability inherent in shadow enforcement, cry out for 
reconsideration of Lopez-Mendoza.  Despite its many limitations,209 the 
exclusionary rule has proven to be one of the most effective mechanisms for 
enforcing Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and 
seizure.210 
When the Supreme Court declined to apply the exclusionary rule in the 
case of garden-variety Fourth Amendment violations, it acknowledged that 
if such violations became “widespread,” there would be cause for 
reconsideration.211  Evidence now shows that this is the case, which thus 
permits lower courts to apply the full exclusionary rule while also still 
following Lopez-Mendoza.212 
 
209 See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 187, at 1624–27 (noting the limited effectiveness of the 
exclusionary rule in immigration context).  Chacón argues for additional reforms in 
immigration court procedure, in federal courts’ abilities to hear pattern and practice of abuse 
cases, and in accountability mechanisms for ICE.  Id. at 1623–33. 
210 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 220 (1960) (detailing the experience of 
California, which adopted the exclusionary rule in 1955 after concluding that other remedies 
“completely failed” to secure compliance with the Fourth Amendment and whose attorney 
general two years later pronounced the rule’s effects as “excellent”). 
211 INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984). 
212 See, e.g., Oliva-Ramos v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 2012) (“The IJ and 
the Board should have, but did not, first determine whether agents violated Oliva-Ramos’s 
Fourth Amendment rights and second, whether any such violations implicated the Lopez-
Mendoza exception for being widespread or egregious.”). 
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Alternatively, the Supreme Court could revisit and overturn Lopez-
Mendoza, acknowledging the changes in virtually every factor since nearly 
three decades ago when it weighed the costs and benefits of applying the 
exclusionary rule in immigration. 
a. Lopez-Mendoza’s Outdated Factual Analysis 
It is well-established that the Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez-
Mendoza was based on weighing factual realities about immigration 
enforcement as that enforcement was conducted in 1984, and that those 
factual underpinnings have been thoroughly undermined by immigration 
enforcement revolutions in the decades since.213  The Lopez-Mendoza Court 
held that the use of the exclusionary rule could only be justified in the civil 
immigration context if its social benefit (that is, deterring Fourth 
Amendment violations by INS officers) outweighed its costs.214  The Court 
found that the additional deterrent value of the exclusionary rule would be 
minimal, largely because the INS, then the sole agency charged with 
immigration enforcement, already had a comprehensive scheme for 
avoiding and punishing agents’ constitutional violations.215  That single, 
centralized enforcer, of course, is gone, and the protections for Fourth 
Amendment rights that the Court found in that structure have disappeared 
as well. 
b. Lopez-Mendoza’s Faulty Understanding of Administrative Immigration 
Violations  
Most recently, there has also been an important shift in the 
understanding of the legal context in which the costs and benefits of the rule 
are weighed.  In 1984, the Supreme Court weighed the social costs of the 
exclusionary rule in Lopez-Mendoza.  In so doing, it gave considerable, and 
perhaps controlling weight to its conclusion that application of the rule 
would “allow[] the criminal to continue in the commission of an ongoing 
crime.”216  The Court stated that it had never gone to the extreme of 
applying the rule where that would allow ongoing criminal activity.217  In 
 
213 See supra note 187. 
214 Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1042–43. 
215 Id. at 1044–45. 
216 Id. at 1047.  The Court summarized the factors that weighed most heavily: the steps 
INS had taken to deter violations and the high cost of allowing criminal activity to continue.  
Id. at 1050. 
217 The Court explained in a footnote its conclusion that unauthorized, unregistered 
presence in the United States constituted an ongoing criminal offense under 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1302 and 1306 (which includes willful failure to register as an alien).  Id. at 1047 n.3.  
However, the Court had no information about whether the respondent in the case had 
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contrast, in Arizona v. United States, the Court made clear that unauthorized 
presence in the United States is not, by itself, a criminal offense: 
As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain present in the 
United States.  If the police stop someone based on nothing more than possible 
removability, the usual predicate for an arrest is absent.218 
Given the importance that the Lopez-Mendoza Court gave to the 
“unique” cost of allowing a crime to continue, this shift in legal 
understanding fundamentally changes the balance of the factors in the 
decision whether to apply the exclusionary rule.  While it does not change 
the fact that a civil immigration violation is an ongoing violation of (civil) 
law, it does change the weight to be given the factor. 
Furthermore, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) itself and the 
implementation of immigration policy already recognize that the avoidance 
or remediation of past or current immigration violations may sometimes be 
foregone in the interest of some other value.  For example, individuals who 
are out of valid immigration status are generally prohibited from becoming 
permanent residents by adjusting their status.219  However, the law provides 
a number of exceptions that allow authorities to “overlook” such violations, 
including if a person is the immediate relative of a U.S. citizen, if she is a 
special immigrant juvenile, or if she qualifies as a victim of domestic 
violence.220  In each of these cases, a family or humanitarian value is 
permitted to override the general principle that one must be in lawful 
nonimmigrant status to obtain permanent residence.221 
The Obama Administration’s policies encouraging prosecutorial 
discretion are an even better example of immigration policymaking in 
which humanitarian values are recognized as outweighing, in certain 
 
registered, and the Court failed to take into account the required element of willfulness in 
§ 1306.  See id. 
218 Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2505 (2012) (emphasis added) (internal 
citation omitted). 
219 8 U.S.C. § 1255(c)(7) (2012) (prohibiting adjustment of status for individuals “not in 
a lawful nonimmigrant status”). 
220 Id.; 8 C.F.R. § 245.1(b)(5) (2012) (restricting adjustment for out-of-status individuals 
but excepting immediate relatives, special immigrant juveniles, Violence Against Women 
Act self-petitioners, and others); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2012) (allowing the 
cancellation of removal for certain out-of-status individuals whose citizen or resident family 
members would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship). 
221 Other instances in which arrestees can obtain waivers for civil immigration violations 
include adjustment of status under INA § 245(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) (which waives unlawful 
entry or status for those with a petition filed before May 1, 2001); waivers of inadmissibility 
under INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (which waives inadmissibility where the applicant 
shows rehabilitation or extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen or resident family member); and 
INA § 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i) (which waives an immigration fraud violation where the 
applicant can show extreme hardship to a U.S. citizen or resident family member). 
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circumstances, administrative violations of immigration law.  The Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) initiative is perhaps the clearest 
illustration of the Administration’s wider prosecutorial discretion policies.  
The DACA initiative, in essence, recognizes qualified applicants’ 
immigration violations but reflects the Administration’s policy decision to 
nonetheless grant deferred action, allowing them to remain in the United 
States and obtain work authorization.222  This situation is even more 
analogous to the exclusionary rule’s application, because deferred action 
does not change the individual’s underlying immigration status, but rather 
leaves her without formal lawful status in continuing violation of the 
immigration law.  It justifies doing so to preserve values of family unity and 
fairness to individuals who did not themselves make any decision to violate 
the law.223 
Our contemporary understanding of administrative immigration 
violations, as Arizona expressed, recognizes that immigration violations are 
civil, and not criminal, offenses.  This understanding allows for the 
possibility that in some circumstances, such civil violations should be 
waived or even allowed to continue to vindicate other important values.  In 
the context of our Constitution’s commitment to individual rights and to 
limits on law enforcement authority, the equal protection of the law for 
people of all races and nationalities seems to be just such an important 
value.  Furthermore, overlooking an individual’s civil violation by applying 
the exclusionary rule in immigration cases seems particularly justified when 
doing so would not only safeguard the individual’s Fourth Amendment 
rights, but would also directly confront the government abuse of power that 
occurs when officers operating outside their lawful mandate conduct 
racially biased policing. 
2. Fully Applying the Existing Exclusionary Rule in Immigration Courts 
To the extent that courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals have 
sanctioned the use of a limited exclusionary rule in circumstances of 
egregious violations, the rule can and should be used by immigration judges 
to sanction (and thus deter) state and local officers’ abuses.  Though Lopez-
Mendoza sought to preclude the exclusionary rule’s use in immigration 
proceedings, the exception it left open for egregious violations has allowed 
for evidence suppression in limited circumstances in the decades since.  The 
Board of Immigration Appeals and most of the appellate courts have at least 
indirectly recognized a limited rule that permits exclusion where a litigant 
 
222 See Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
http://goo.gl/eqjHhm (last visited Apr. 16, 2014). 
223 See id. 
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can prove an egregious violation of his rights or where violations are so 
severe as to offend due process.224 
However, invoking the rule in immigration court remains fairly 
unusual, and the Board has not issued clear guidance on the limits of its 
proper application.  As a result, “nearly three decades after Lopez-Mendoza, 
Immigration Judges still find themselves with little guidance when faced 
with requests for suppression.”225  Many judges are uncomfortable 
suppressing evidence, even when documentation indicates that a 
respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights may have been violated in 
significant ways.  In one recent case, for example, a well-documented 
motion to suppress was denied summarily with the following handwritten 
note by the judge on a form order: 
A removal proceeding is a purely civil action to determine a person’s eligibility to 
remain in the United States.  Various protections that apply in criminal proceedings, 
do not apply in civil proceeding such as removal proceedings.  The mere fact of an 
illegal arrest, assuming that one occurred, has no bearing on a subsequent removal 
proceeding.  INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 480 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984).226 
This reductionist reading of Lopez-Mendoza ignores the fact that the 
Board indirectly recognized the potential for suppression when it 
established a procedural framework for adjudicating suppression cases.227  
In failing to take account of the case law following Lopez-Mendoza, the 
immigration judge acted to cut off even the limited access the Supreme 
Court allowed to constitutional protection. 
In another case, an immigration judge held that even if an arresting 
state officer may have violated the Fourth Amendment, an immigration 
court has no authority to “impose a penalty” on a non-DHS officer by 
suppressing evidence that the state officer may have illegally seized.228  
 
224 See, e.g., Luevano v. Holder, 660 F.3d 1207, 1212 (10th Cir. 2011); Almeida-Amaral 
v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 234 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying Lopez-Mendoza and exploring 
circumstances “when an egregious violation would properly lead to the suppression of 
evidence in a civil proceeding”); Matter of Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 609, 611–12 (B.I.A. 
1988) (establishing, without discussing Lopez-Mendoza, a procedural framework for 
adjudicating motions to suppress). 
225 Kate Mahoney, What to Do When the Constable Blunders? Egregious Violations of 
the Fourth Amendment in Removal Proceedings, 6 IMMIGRATION L. ADVISOR 1, 2 (2012), 
available at http://goo.gl/n1o2nl. 
226 Order of the Immigration Judge, [name and case number redacted] (U.S. Immigration 
Ct., Baltimore, Jan. 5, 2011) (on file with the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology) 
Fortunately, this particular decision was overturned by the Board of Immigration Appeals, 
but, from the author’s experience, many such immigration judge decisions go unappealed 
and become final.  See, e.g., In re Removal Proceedings, [name and case number redacted] 
(B.I.A. Jan. 24, 2013)). 
227 Barcenas, 19 I. & N. at 611–12. 
228 Oral Decision of the Immigration Judge, supra note 15, at 13. 
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These decisions essentially give state law enforcement a free pass to violate 
constitutional rights without fear of consequence.  At a minimum, they do 
not represent a strategy likely to enhance constitutional compliance among 
either DHS or state and local officers. 
By contrast, immigration judges should ensure due process in the 
proceedings over which they preside.  They should apply the exclusionary 
rule to the extent they are permitted to do so to vindicate egregious Fourth 
Amendment rights violations, whether those violations are committed by 
DHS or state officers.  To facilitate this robust application of existing law, 
the Board should issue a clear precedential decision authorizing the use of 
the exclusionary rule in the circumstances permitted by Lopez-Mendoza and 
delineating standards for its application.  In addition, the Executive Office 
for Immigration Review should continue to educate judges about the 
current state of suppression law in immigration courts.229 
C. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
DHS should exercise its considerable power of prosecutorial discretion 
to make clear to its own agents and to state and local law enforcement 
authorities that it will not enforce the nation’s immigration laws at the 
expense of individual constitutional rights.  DHS has recently dusted off its 
authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether and how 
to pursue removal proceedings, taking steps to standardize the decision not 
to pursue removal in cases that do not reflect DHS’s enforcement 
priorities.230  Since 2010, DHS has defined low and high enforcement 
priorities, addressing a long list of possible factual and legal factors that 
affect the priority the government gives to an individual’s removal.231 
 
229 See generally, for example, the Executive Office for Immigration Review’s legal 
updates on the exclusionary rule, including Jonathan Calkins & Elizabeth Donnelly, Trust, 
but Verify: Document Similarities and Credibility Findings in Immigration Proceedings, 5 
IMMIGRATION L. ADVISOR 1, 6 (2011), available at http://goo.gl/2w33sH; Mahoney, supra 
note 225. 
230 For a discussion of prosecutorial discretion in immigration proceedings, see generally 
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243 (2010); MARY KENNEY, AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: HOW TO ADVOCATE FOR YOUR CLIENT (2011), available at 
http://goo.gl/rQwlWQ; Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., ICE, to All Field Office Dirs. 
et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration 
Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of 
Aliens (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Morton Memo on Prosecutorial Discretion], available at 
http://goo.gl/zK1PMy. 
231 These factors address, inter alia, pending applications for immigration relief, close 
U.S. citizens and resident family members, victims of serious crimes, serious health 
problems, criminal convictions, and, most famously and comprehensively, individuals 
brought to the United States as children.  See Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant 
280 MAUREEN A. SWEENEY [Vol. 104 
Nowhere in this long list of factors, however, does DHS address the 
constitutionality of the arrests underlying individuals’ removal proceedings.  
While one of DHS’s policy memos instructs agents to give low priority to 
“plaintiffs in non-frivolous lawsuits regarding civil rights or liberties 
violations,”232 the agency has never taken the more direct step of clearly 
stating a policy of refusing to “profit” from DHS’s or other officers’ 
unconstitutional enforcement behavior.  Such a policy, if vigorously 
enforced,233 could have a powerful deterrent effect on officers tempted to 
evade constitutional prohibitions in pursuit of immigration arrests or 
referrals.  DHS should clearly communicate its commitment to protect 
individuals’ constitutional rights in immigration enforcement by adding the 
constitutionality of the underlying detention and arrest to the list of factors 
its attorneys consider in deciding whether to pursue removal. 
It appears that DHS already declines to prosecute some cases when it 
finds unconstitutional policing.  According to an attorney who represented 
some racial profiling victims who participated in DOJ’s investigation of the 
Alamance County Sheriff’s Office, DHS terminated removal proceedings in 
some cases where litigants were prepared to fight their arrests’ 
constitutionality.234  DHS did not publicly acknowledge this as the 
motivation for terminating proceedings, however, simply indicating that the 
Notices to Appear initiating the cases had been “improvidently issued.”235  
 
Sec’y, ICE, to Peter S. Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor, ICE, & James Chaparro, Exec. 
Assoc. Dir., Enforcement and Removal Operations, ICE, Guidance Regarding the Handling 
of Removal Proceedings of Aliens with Pending or Approved Applications or Petitions 2–3 
(Aug. 20, 2010), available at http://goo.gl/Er9NIY; see also Morton Memo on Prosecutorial 
Discretion, supra note 230, at 4–5; Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., ICE, to All Field 
Office Dirs. et al., Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs 2 
(June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Morton Memo on Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs], available 
at http://goo.gl/LqswWp; Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to 
David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot. et al. 1 (June 15, 2012), 
available at http://goo.gl/jUPwe6 (discussing people brought into the United States as 
children, specifically). 
232 Morton Memo on Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs, supra note 230, at 2. 
233 Surveys have called into question whether DHS’s rank-and-file officers and attorneys 
are exercising discretion to the extent directed by headquarters.  See AM. IMMIGRATION 
LAWYERS ASS’N & AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, HOLDING DHS ACCOUNTABLE ON 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 4 (2011), available at http://goo.gl/ANCacp (noting the 
lukewarm nature and inconsistency of implementation of prosecutorial discretion priorities 
in many ICE offices); AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: A 
STATISTICAL ASSESSMENT 2 (2012), available at http://goo.gl/sDU8G8 (reporting 
administrative closure rate of approximately 7% resulting from DHS’s case-by-case review 
of removal proceedings). 
234 Telephone Conversation Between Marty Rosenbluth, Exec. Dir., N.C. Immigrant 
Rights Project, and Maureen Sweeney (Jan. 28, 2013) (notes on file with author). 
235 Id. 
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At the same time, ICE attorneys in other cases have declined to exercise 
discretion in cases where they had significant evidence of the arrests’ 
unconstitutionality and have, in fact, indicated indirectly that the decisions 
to litigate the arrests’ constitutionality weighed against terminating those 
prosecutions.236  ICE should support its stated commitment to constitutional 
enforcement by clearly identifying arrest constitutionality as a factor for 
prosecutorial discretion and by ensuring that its attorneys and officers 
refuse to profit from unconstitutional policing by actually exercising that 
discretion. 
D. CIVIL RIGHTS ADVOCACY 
Perhaps the most important role in the ongoing struggle against racial 
profiling and unconstitutional immigration enforcement is that of 
individuals and advocates who must persist in challenging these practices in 
every conceivable forum.  One lesson from the ongoing struggle against 
racial profiling in general law enforcement is that no single quick or easy or 
comprehensive strategy can defeat what remains a pervasive practice.  
Activists and advocates need to employ a full range of legal, political, 
economic, community organizing, and media strategies.237  The political 
profile of Latino and other racial and ethnic minorities has risen as the 
demographics of many communities have changed,238 and advocates need 
to translate this potential into active political clout that can challenge 
practices that harm their communities. 
Immigration attorneys should certainly continue to raise the issue by 
advocating for prosecutorial discretion in individual cases and by filing 
suppression motions where they are warranted.  They should make the case 
that Lopez-Mendoza needs to be reconsidered or is no longer controlling 
 
236 In one case, the ICE Office of Chief Counsel responded to a request for prosecutorial 
discretion twenty-two minutes after the request was filed with the following reference to a 
pending motion to suppress: “I note that significant resources have already been expended in 
the two plus years these proceedings have been pending, and we still do not have a 
resolution as to even the preliminary issue of alienage.”  E-mail from Melody A. Brukiewa, 
Chief Counsel, to Laura T. Ruiz Rivera & Maureen Sweeney, Re: [name redacted] (Jan. 31, 
2012, 12:27 PM) (on file with author and the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology).  
The response did not refer to a single prosecutorial discretion factor identified in the agency 
memoranda.  Id. 
237 See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 75, at 1074. 
238 See, e.g., MARK HUGO LOPEZ & PAUL TAYLOR, PEW HISPANIC CTR., LATINO VOTERS 
IN THE 2012 ELECTION 5 (2012), available at hhttp://goo.gl/LdiQ7C; Karen E. Krummy & 
Allison Sherry, Changing Demographics Contributes to Democrats Win, DENVER POST 
(Nov. 8, 2011, 4:34 PM), http://goo.gl/x2L4Jt; Cindy Y. Rodriguez, Latino Vote Key to 
Obama’s Re-election, CNN.COM (Nov. 9, 2012, 4:42 PM), http://goo.gl/wQAC35; Donna St. 
George & Brady Dennis, Growing Share of Hispanic Voters Helped Push Obama to Victory, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2012), http://goo.gl/TPPRJz. 
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because of the widespread nature of Fourth Amendment violations.239  In 
addition, though, civil rights organizations should continue to organize and 
advocate against race-based policing broadly, using police complaint 
procedures as well as the power of the media and grassroots campaigns.  
Perhaps most importantly, civil rights attorneys and plaintiffs need to do the 
hard work of suing state and local jurisdictions that racially profile Latinos 
and members of other immigrant communities.  Hitting these jurisdictions 
in the pocketbook may, in the end, be the most effective way to promote the 
equal protection of law at the local level. 
CONCLUSION 
Recent years have seen the dramatic rise of shadow immigration 
enforcement by state and local police, troopers, and sheriffs.  These 
officers’ day-to-day involvement in ascertaining and communicating 
immigration information to federal authorities has significantly distorted  
local law enforcement, adding routine racial profiling and hyper-
enforcement against Latinos and others perceived to be “foreign.”  Despite 
its pervasiveness, this distortion most often remains unacknowledged and 
“under the table,” both because immigration arrests and referrals are not 
part of the explicit enforcement mandate of state and local officers, and 
because they are so easily masked by pretextual enforcement of traffic and 
other laws.  It is essential that this dynamic be recognized and aggressively 
addressed, however, because its victims are constitutionally vulnerable and 
its consequences for communities and for effective law enforcement are 
severe.  The victimization and alienation of some members of our 
communities prejudice law enforcement effectiveness  and the sense of 
security we should all feel.  Activists, advocates, judges, law enforcement 
administrators, governmental officers, and attorneys at all levels must use 
all tools at their disposal to defend with resolute loyalty the principle that all 
persons in our communities are entitled to the equal protection of the law 
and to fair treatment by those charged with enforcing it. 
 
 
239 Immigration judges and lower federal courts could not, of course, overturn Lopez-
Mendoza, but the issue must be raised there to preserve it for eventual review by the 
Supreme Court. 
